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PERFECTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF A MECHANIC'S
LIEN IN VIRGINIA: A DEFENSE LAWYER'S PERSPECTIVE
James L. Windsor*
I. INTRODUCTION
The right to a mechanic's lien in Virginia is statutorily created
and the Supreme Court of Virginia requires strict adherence to
these statutes.' During mechanic's lien litigation, the validity of
the underlying indebtedness to the claimant or the quality of the
claimant's work often has little bearing on whether the lien is valid
or enforceable. Rather, the question revolves around whether the
claimant or his attorney substantially complied with the proce-
dures mandated by the statutes as interpreted by the courts. These
procedural or "technical" defenses are usually raised in the initial
or preliminary stages of the litigation, long before any issue regard-
ing whether the amounts claimed by the claimant are properly due
are addressed.
This article will examine the creation of mechanics' liens2 and
the procedures for perfection, 3 priority,4 and enforcement 5 of
mechanics' liens. Intertwined in these statutory requirements are
defenses, both procedural6 and substantive,7 that will be explored
from a defense lawyer's perspective. Throughout this article are
war stories and caveats to assist those who practice in this rela-
tively sophisticated area of the law. Emphasis in this article will be
on Virginia statutory and decisional law, but not to the exclusion
of important decisions in other jurisdictions."
* Associate, Kaufman & Canoles, P.C., Newport News, Virginia. B.S., 1982, James
Madison University; J.D., 1985, University of Richmond.
1. Rosser v. Cole, 237 Va. 572, 576, 379 S.E.2d 323, 325 (1989); Coleman v. Pearman, 159
Va. 72, 80, 165 S.E. 371, 373 (1932) (The statutory provisions for mechanics' liens are indis-
pensable and the omission of any one of them is fatal.); Clement v. Adams Bros.-Payne Co.,
113 Va. 547, 552, 75 S.E. 294, 296 (1912).
2. See VA. CODE ANN. § 43-3 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
3. See id. § 43-4.
4. See id. § 43-21.
5. See id. § 43-22.
6. See infra notes 183-96 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 197-202 and accompanying text.
8. The time-honored legislative policy in Virginia relating to mechanics' liens is based
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Mechanic's lien statutes are strictly construed against the
mechanic's lien claimant.9 Both the lien and the jurisdiction of the
court depend upon the statutes, and not upon equitable or ethical
rules.10 Neither the conscience of the chancellor nor "the length of
his foot" can supplement the statutes." Although the Supreme
Court of Virginia liberally construes provisions relating to the en-
forcement of the lien as opposed to the perfection of the lien, in
practice, enforcement statutes are strictly construed as well.' 2 The
court has repeatedly refused to "blue pencil" a mechanic's lien to
cure a procedural defect which would cause a forfeiture. A thor-
ough understanding of the basics of Virginia mechanics' lien law is
essential prior to utilizing this extraordinary remedy. However, an
acute appreciation of the pitfalls is equally paramount before trav-
eling down such a treacherous path.
II. CREATION OF THE LIEN
The creation of a mechanic's lien is addressed statutorily and
provides:
All persons performing labor or furnishing materials of the value of
fifty dollars or more, for the construction, removal, repair or im-
provement of any building or structure permanently annexed to the
freehold, . . . shall have a lien, if perfected as hereinafter provided,
upon such building or structure, and so much land therewith as shall
upon the "New York system," under which the lien of a subcontractor or materialman de-
pends on, and is limited by, the amount due the general contractor at the time the owner
receives notice of the lien. See Nicholas v. Miller, 182 Va. 831, 834-35, 30 S.E.2d 696, 697
(1944); Robinson v. Herrell Constr. Co., 7 Va. Cir. 308, 311 (City of Winchester 1986); Note,
Mechanics' Lien in Virginia, 29 VA. L. REV. 122-23 (1942). While Virginia's statutory
scheme is patterned after the New York system, the Virginia statutes, as a whole, are
unique. Therefore, no attempt will be made to examine the statutes regarding mechanics'
liens in other jurisdictions. Thus, the persuasive value of any foreign decisions cited herein
necessarily must be gauged only after comparing and contrasting the specific statute, or
perhaps the entire statutory system, being construed or interpreted by such case with that
of Virginia.
9. Cf. Liberty Perpetual Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Furbush & Son Mach. Co., 80 F. 631, 637
(4th Cir. 1897) (in order for a mechanic's lien to be valid, the claim must have been filed
within forty days after work was done).
10. See Wallace v. Brumback, 177 Va. 36, 40, 12 S.E.2d 801, 802 (1941); Bristol Iron &
Steel Co. v. Thomas, 93 Va. 396, 400-01, 25 S.E. 110, 111-12 (1896).
11. Feuchtenberger v. Williamson, Carroll & Saunders, 137 Va. 578, 585, 120 S.E. 257, 259
(1923).
12. See H.N. Francis & Co. v. Hotel Rueger, Inc., 125 Va. 106, 121, 99 S.E. 690, 694
(1919).
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be necessary for the convenient use of enjoyment thereof. . . . 3
Numerous examples of improvements and types of materials and
labor, which are deemed to be permanently affixed to the freehold
and thus subject to a mechanic's lien, are statutorily defined.14 It is
clear from these two statutes that the issue of whether a building
or structure is "permanently annexed" or affixed to the land is a
primary consideration in ascertaining the right to a mechanic's
lien.15
Early decisions by the Supreme Court of Virginia placed great
emphasis on the extent to which the building or structure was af-
fixed in determining whether it was "permanently annexed to the
freehold" and thus subject to a mechanic's lien.' 6 Recent rulings by
other courts construing Virginia law have also focused on the de-
gree of affixation in determining whether a structure attached to
realty is permanently annexed to the real property.
17
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-3(a) (Repl. Vol. 1990) (emphasis added).
14. Section 43-2 of the Code of Virginia provides:
For the purpose of this chapter, a well, excavation, sidewalk, driveway, pavement,
parking lot, retaining wall, curb and/or gutter, breakwater (either salt or fresh water),
water system, drainage structure, filtering system (including septic or waste disposal
systems) or swimming pool shall be deemed a structure permanently annexed to the
freehold, and all shrubbery, earth, sod, sand, gravel, brick, stone, tile, pipe or other
materials, together with the reasonable rental or use value of equipment and any
surveying, grading, clearing or earth moving required for the improvement of the
grounds upon which such building or structure is situated shall be deemed to be
materials furnished for the improvement of such building or structure and perma-
nently annexed to the freehold.
Id. § 43-2.
15. The statutory predecessors of section 43-3(a) of the Code of Virginia date to the origi-
nal codification of the law of mechanics' liens in Virginia in 1843. See 1843 VA. Acrs, Ch. 76,
§ 1-6. The archaic language requiring the building or structure to be "permanently annexed
to the freehold" should be read in conjunction with decisions regarding the law pertaining to
fixtures rendered by the Supreme Court of Virginia in the nineteenth century and early
twentieth century. See Haskin Wood Vulcanizing Co. v. Cleveland Ship-Bldg. Co., 94 Va.
439, 26 S.E. 878 (1897). The use of this phrase by the General Assembly of Virginia when
the mechanics' liens statutes were originally enacted, seems to indicate that the necessary
analysis is similar to the inquiry required to ascertain whether an item attached to realty
remains personalty or is converted to a fixture.
16. Machinery and equipment which are of a permanent character and essential to the
purpose of the building may be the subject of a mechanic's lien even though severable with-
out lasting injury to the machinery or the building. Haskin Wood Vulcanizing Co., 94 Va. at
447, 26 S.E. at 880 (citing Morotock Ins. Co. v. Rodefer Bros., 92 Va. 747, 749, 24 S.E. 393,
394 (1896)); see Annotation, Air Conditioning Appliance, Equipment, or Apparatus as Fix-
ture, 69 A.L.R. 4th 359 (1989).
17. In re Jessie's Paving Co., 39 Bankr. 265 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1983) (sheet-metal storage
shed mounted on asphalt base and structures consisting of cinder blocks mortared together
and affixed to realty on poured concrete constituted fixtures). But see In re Concrete Struc-
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Virginia courts apply a three-pronged test to determine whether
an article of personal property affixed to realty is converted to a
fixture. In the absence of any specific agreement between the par-
ties, the following criteria should be considered: (1) the extent to
which the building or structure is permanently affixed to the land;
(2) whether the building or structure is essential to the use of the
realty; and, (3) the intention of the owner of the building or struc-
ture to make it a permanent addition to the realty.18
The intention of the annexing party is the chief and controlling
factor in evaluating whether personalty affixed to realty is con-
verted to a fixture.19 For example, the Supreme Court of Virginia
enforced an agreement between the parties which provided that
certain equipment would remain personalty even where it is clearly
affixed to the real estate.20 Thus, if a claimant attempts to enforce
a mechanic's lien, the owner of the encumbered property may ar-
gue that the claimant is not entitled to a mechanic's lien since the
claimant retained title and ownership of the material such that it
is not permanently annexed to the freehold. A conditional seller of
materials to be used in the construction of a building or structure
who reserves title to the materials is ordinarily not precluded from
perfecting a mechanic's lien against the realty in which the materi-
als are incorporated.2'
tures, Inc., 9 Bankr. 72, 73 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982) (building fastened to concrete by sup-
ports which were integrated into concrete slab remained personalty).
18. Danville Holding Corp. v. Clement, 178 Va. 223, 232, 16 S.E.2d 345, 349 (1941).
19. State Highway & Transp. Comm'r v. Edwards Co., 220 Va. 90, 95, 255 S.E.2d 500, 503
(1979) (citing Danville Holding Corp. v. Clement, 178 Va. 223, 232, 16 S.E.2d 345, 349
(1941)). For example, if the transaction involves a conditional sale, where the seller retains
title and ownership of the materials used in constructing the building or structure until the
seller has been paid, this arguably demonstrates an intent by the seller to characterize the
materials as personalty, irrespective of whether they are "permanently annexed to the free-
hold." Therefore, the seller may not be entitled to file a mechanic's lien. Annotation, Claim
of Lien By Conditional Vendors as Waiver of Title, 45 A.L.R. 185 (1926); cf. Sharlin v.
Neighborhood Theatre, Inc., 209 Va. 718, 167 S.E.2d 334 (1969) (tenant had right to remove
items affixed to realty where lease provided items would remain property of tenant). The
fact that a seller reserved the right to repossess the material in the contract, however, is not
determinative since the legal right to remove the material is not synonymous with the intent
to remove it. See Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Prince William County, 210 Va.
550, 556, 172 S.E.2d 757, 762 (1970).
20. Tunis Lumber Co. v. R. G. Dennis Lumber Co., 97 Va. 682, 686, 34 S.E. 613, 614
(1899).
21. See DeMarzo v. Gatto, 204 Misc. 691, -, 125 N.Y.S.2d 229, 230 (1953); Annotation,
Right of Conditional Seller of Chattels Attached to Realty to Claim Lien on the Realty, 58
A.L.R. 1121 (1929). The rationale of the authorities supporting this general proposition is
that the retention of title is not inconsistent with the lien given by a statute. As a matter of
law, it does not show an intention to waive the lien, nor does it obligate the materialmen to
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There is a difference of opinion as to whether the enforcement,
or attempted enforcement, by a conditional seller of property of a
mechanic's lien upon the property is a waiver of the reserved title.
According to one line of authority, the mere attempt to enforce a
mechanic's lien upon the property constitutes a waiver. Such an
attempt is held to be inconsistent with the theory that title re-
mains in the seller.22 While there is no decision of record in Vir-
ginia directly on point, a statute provides that "[t]he remedies af-
forded by this chapter shall be deemed cumulative in nature and
not be construed to be in lieu of any other legal or equitable reme-
dies.123 Arguably a conditional seller may be entitled to perfect
and enforce a mechanic's lien; however, the claimant should be
aware that there may be a defense raised regarding the title reten-
tion. The filing of a mechanic's lien where title has been retained
may act as a waiver of the right to later repossess the materials or
equipment furnished. Accordingly, the claimant runs a substantial
risk of losing its right to repossess the property if it elects to file a
mechanic's lien.
The applicability of a second defense is pegged to whether the
property is publicly or privately owned and to the intended use of
the property. Buildings or structures erected under a contract with
the Commonwealth, cities, counties, political subdivisions and
assert such title by resuming possession of the materials or equipment. Such retention of
title merely furnishes him with the security for payment in addition to that provided by the
lien statute. Id. at 1123; Floyd v. Rambo, 250 Ala. 101, -, 33 So. 2d 360, 363 (1948); Bren-
ndr-Williams, Inc, v. Romine, 200 Kan. 483, -, 437 P.2d 312, 316 (1968). The theory is that
there can be no objection to a creditor having more than one security for the same debt.
Warner Elevator Mfg. Co. v. Capital Inv. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 127 Mich. 323, -, 86 N.W.
828, 829 (1901). A seller was not entitled to a mechanic's lien where the contract provided
that the heating system installed by the seller was to remain personal property even if the
system was a permanent fixture. Hartlin v. Cody, 144 Conn. 499, -, 134 A.2d 245, 249
(1957).
22. Annotation, Claim of Lien by Conditional Vendor as Waiver of Title, 45 A.L.R. 185
(1926). This is true, even though the attempt to enforce the lien is unsuccessful. Barbour
Plumbing, Heating & Elec. Co. v. Ewing, 16 Ala. App. 280, 77 So. 430 (1917). Even if the
attempt to enforce the lien fails because the seller has not complied with statutory require-
ment it does not defeat the election. Hickman v. Richberg, 122 Ala. 638, -, 26 So. 136, 137
(1897). An action to enforce a mechanic's lien by the conditional seller of property has been
viewed to be an election to declare the title of the property to be in the buyer, and a judg-
ment which establishes the mechanic's lien, an adjudication that title is the buyer. Bramhall
v. McDonald, 172 A.D. 788, -, 158 N.Y.S. 736, 738 (N.Y. App. Div. 1916); cf. Elwood State
Bank v. Mock, 40 Ind. App. 685, 82 N.E. 1003 (1907). Other courts have held that "simply
filing notice of a mechanic's lien falls far short of an election," even though complete en-
forcement of a mechanic's lien would probably result in a waiver of title. Warner Elevator
Mfg. Co. v. Capital Inv. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 127 Mich. 323, 327, 86 N.W. 828, 830 (1901).
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-23.2 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
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other quasi-public entities such as sanitary districts and water and
sewer authorities "used for public uses or purposes" are exempt
from the application of the Virginia mechanic's lien law.24 Property
is not subject to a mechanic's lien if the building or structure er-
ected on the property is "for public uses" of the Commonwealth,
its counties, or cities. If the building or structure which was con-
structed by a public body will be privately used, the property is
not exempt from mechanic's lien law.2"
III. THE PLAYERS-DEFINITIONS AND DEFENSES
Inherent in determining the validity and enforceability of a
mechanic's lien is an understanding of who the players are and
how their status affects a claimant's ability to obtain a lien. The
players' posture may also serve as a defense to the mechanic's lien.
A. Owner
The term "owner" is not defined by statute in Virginia, but it
generally means the person having an interest in the property who,
either directly or through an agent, causes labor or materials to be
furnished or supplied in the erection or repair of a building or
structure.26 Before a claimant can file, and thus perfect, a
24. Legg v. County School Bd., 157 Va. 295, 300, 160 S.E. 60, 61 (1931); Bowers v. Town
of Martinsville, 156 Va. 497, 511, 159 S.E. 196, 200 (1931); Phillips v. Rector & Visitors of
the University of Virginia, 97 Va. 472, 474, 34 S.E. 66, 67 (1899); Manly Mfg. Co. v. Broad-
dus, 94 Va. 547, 555, 27 S.E. 438, 441 (1897). Instead, the provisions of the Virginia "Little
Miller Act," may be applicable in these cases. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-58, -62 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
In regard to public buildings or public works of the United States, no mechanic's lien can
attach and the Miller Act applies. 40 U.S.C. §§ 270a-f (1982).
25. See Phillips, 97 Va. at 474, 34 S.E. at 68. Where a municipality and a private devel-
oper enter into a joint venture whereby the developer constructs a building to be used for
essentially private purposes on property owned by a municipality, can a person who per-
forms labor or supplies materials for the construction of the building claim a lien against the
building and so much of the land as is necessary for the convenient use and enjoyment
thereof? See American Seating Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 434 Pa. 370, -, 256 A.2d 599,
601 (1969) (exception to the general rule that municipal property is exempt from mechanics'
liens was found where the municipality had given its tenant consent to improve the land
necessary to subject it to a mechanic's lien claim). See generally Annotation, Municipal
Property as Subject to a Mechanics' Lien, 51 A.L.R.3d 657 (1973).
26. E.E. Stump Well Drilling v. Willis, 230 Va. 445, 449,,338 S.E.2d 841, 843 (1986); Blan-
ton v. Owen, 203 Va. 73, 78, 122 S.E.2d 650, 653 (1961); Feuchtenberger v. Williamson,
Carroll & Saunders, 137 Va. 578, 586, 120 S.E. 257, 259 (1923). The definition of "owner"
does not include any person holding title to property to secure a debt or indemnify a surety.
VA. CODE ANN. § 43-1 (Repl. Vol. 1990); see Loyola Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Herndon
Lumber & Millwork, Inc., 218 Va. 803, 805, 241 S.E.2d 752, 753 (1978) (a trustee under a
deed of trust is not an owner within the meaning of Title 43 of the Virginia Code).
296
1991] PERFECTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF MECHANIC'S LIEN 297
mechanic's lien, the claimant must conduct a title examination of
the records in the clerk's office of the circuit court where the prop-
erty is located to determine the person or persons who own the
property or have an interest therein to be affected.1
7
The claimant should not rely on property owner information ob-
tained from real estate tax records or from an earlier title examina-
tion which was performed to prepare the memorandum of
mechanic's lien when filing the mechanic's lien. Rather, the claim-
ant should "update the title" to the date and time of the recorda-
tion. The claimant, or the claimant's attorney, should trace the ti-
tle to the instrument to be recorded or which was recorded
immediately prior to the recordation of the memorandum of
mechanic's lien. This ensures that the owner has not conveyed the
property or resubdivided the property against which the lien is
sought in a manner which might affect the validity of the
mechanic's lien.28
The claimant cannot simply name the person who owned the
property at the time the building or structure was begun or the
materials furnished.2 9 The claimant is required to use the correct
legal name of the owner of the property as reflected in the records
of the clerk's office where the property is located. It may be pru-
27. See ULRICH, VIRGINIA AND WEST VIRGINIA MECHANICS' AND MATERIALMENS' LIENS § 2.5
(1985).
28. Id.
29. Wallace v. Brumback, 177 Va. 36, 41, 12 S.E.2d 801, 803 (1941); see e.g. United Va.
Mortgage Corp. v. Haines Paving Co., 221 Va. 1047, 277 S.E.2d 187 (1981); Loyola Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 218 Va. at 805, 241 S.E.2d at 753; Winder Plumbing, Heating & Air Condi-
tioning, Inc. v. Kanawha Trace Dev. Partners, 19 Va. Cir. 333, 335 (City of Richmond 1990);
Carpet Installation Assoc., Inc. v. Nestor, Ch. No. C78-2010 (City of Norfolk 1979); 1982-
1983 Report of Attorney General, 85-86. The memorandum of mechanic's lien must be re-
corded and indexed in the clerk's office in the general index of deeds in the name of "the
owner of the property" in order for the recordation to give constructive notice to interested
parties. Wallace, 177 Va. at 42, 12 S.E.2d at 803; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 43.4-.5 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
This approach conforms with the Virginia statutes governing the recordation of instru-
ments. Id. §§ 55-96, -55, -105 (Repl. Vol. 1986 & Cum. Supp. 1990). Under the statutes, for
example, a contract for the sale of real estate is void as to lien creditors until it is admitted
to record. Id. at § 55-96 (Cum. Supp. 1990). A mechanic's lien claimant is a lien creditor.
The lien arises from the performance of work for which the lien is claimed. A mechanic's
lien is an inchoate lien which attaches when the labor is performed or the materials fur-
nished and is not affected by a change of ownership, provided that the claimant perfects his
lien as prescribed by statute. See Hadrup v. Sale, 201 Va. 421, 425, 111 S.E.2d 405, 407
(1959); R.C. Lee Carpet & Tile, Inc. v. Core Constr. Corp., 12 Va. Cir. 159, 162 (County of
Spotsylvania 1988). An inchoate mechanic's lien perfected subsequent to a foreclosure sale
is not extinguished as to the purchaser at the sale. Richard Talbott, Inc. v. Swango, 18 Va.
Cir. 5, 6-7 (County of Fairfax 1988).
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dent to contact the State Corporation Commission or search the
partnership or fictitious name records, as applicable, to verify the
name of the owner or uncover any ambiguities which may exist.
Where the wrong entity or person is identified as the owner of the
property subject to a mechanic's lien, this is not a mere misno-
mer.30 Failure to correctly name the record owner of property
against which the lien is sought at the time the memorandum of
mechanic's lien is filed renders the lien invalid.3' The court has
judicial notice of all records in the clerk's office of the circuit court
where the property subject to a mechanic's lien is located. This is
helpful to determine whether the claimant named the correct
owner of the property liened
3 2
If an owner of land or an interest therein fails to record the con-
tract or other instrument evidencing his interest, he is not entitled
to protection from a mechanic's lien and, therefore, is not required
to be named in the mechanic's lien. In other words, the mechanic's
lien claimant has a right to rely on the record and is not required
to go outside the record to determine the identity of any parties
who may claim an interest in the property but who are not re-
flected in the records.3 3 Where the claimant has actual knowledge
that the property sought to be liened is under contract or has been
conveyed, but no instrument evidencing such an event has been
recorded, it may be prudent to name the record owner of the prop-
erty on the date and time the memorandum of lien is filed as well
as the vendee under a contract or the new owner under an unre-
corded deed. A claimant's failure to name a spouse who holds title
30. Rockwell v. Allman, 211 Va. 560, 561, 179 S.E.2d 471, 472 (1971); Flowe Roofing &
Painting Co. v. Rouse Co., 11 Va. Cir. 78, 80 (City of Norfolk 1987).
31. E.E. Stump Well Drilling, Inc. v. Willis, 230 Va. 445, 450, 338 S.E.2d 841, 843 (1986);
Wallace, 177 Va. at 45-46, 12 S.E.2d at 805. But see Mendenhall v. Douglas L. Cooper, Inc.,
239 Va. 71, 76, 387 S.E.2d 468, 471 (1990); Kanawha Trace Dev. Partners, 19 Va. Cir. at
335-36; B.K. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Imprecon Structures, Inc., Ch. No. 110228 (County of
Fairfax 1989); W.H. Stovall & Co. v. Jim's Family Corp., Ch. No. N5490-2 (City of Rich-
mond 1989) (court held lien invalid because it failed to name "the owner of the property
sought to be charged" within the meaning of Virginia Code section 43-20, where contractor
who performed work on partnership property listed the general partners as the property
owners in the memorandum of mechanic's lien).
32. Potomac Say. Bank, v. Virginia Clay Prod., Inc., 19 Va. Cir. 109, 110 (County of
Fairfax 1990).
33. Willis, 230 Va. at 450, 338 S.E.2d at 845. The following are not entitled to protection
from a mechanic's lien unless the instrument evidencing such interest is recorded: (1) a
beneficiary under an unrecorded assignment of a note; (2) a grantee under an unrecorded
deed; or (3) a substituted trustee under a deed of trust. A purchaser under an unrecorded
contract is not an owner for purposes of the mechanic's lien statute. See R.C. Lee Carpet &
Tile, Inc. v. Core Constr. Corp., 12 Va. Cir. 159, 162 (County of Spotsylvania 1988).
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to the property sought to be liened as tenants by the entirety does
not substantially comply with Virginia Code section 43-4, and the
lien is invalid.
34
In order to subject a landlords' interest in a building or structure
to a mechanic's lien, it must appear that the tenant made the im-
provements or repairs while acting as the agent of the owner, for
that purpose, or that the owner caused the repairs or improve-
ments to be made or that the owner ratified what the tenant had
done.35 It may not, however, be necessary to specifically identify
the property being liened as a leasehold interest."' If Virginia Code
section 43-20 were construed as authorizing a lien on the interest
of a person not ordering the work to be done, the provision would
be unconstitutional for taking private property without the owner's
consent.
3 7
The "owner" is the person who requires, contracts for, or autho-
rizes the work to be done or the materials to be furnished. 8 By
statute, only the owner's interest in the land shall be subject to a
mechanic's lien. Therefore, the underlying fee simple estate is not
subject to a lien if the owner has less than a fee simple interest.
3 9
Unless the owner has the fee simple estate, a mechanic's lien
claimant runs a risk of losing his lien rights because the claimant's
34. Wallace, 177 Va. at 41-42, 12 S.E.2d at 803-04; Atkins v. Jim Carpenter Co., 18 Va.
Cir. 432, 434 (County of Stafford 1990); Gunther v. Jennings Cantrell, 11 Va. Cir. 255, 258
(County of Fairfax 1988); Ko v. Stonehenge Constr., Inc., Ch. No. 7096-87 (County of Ches-
terfield 1988); Framesticks, Inc. v. O'Neal, Ch. No. CH-8438 (City of Virginia Beach 1985).
35. Section 43-20 of the Code of Virginia provides:
Subject to the provisions of § 43-3, if the person who shall cause a building or struc-
ture to be erected or repaired owns less than a fee simple estate in the land, then only
his interest therein shall be subject to liens created under this chapter. When the
vendee under a contract for the sale of real estate causes a building or structure to be
erected or repaired on the land which is the subject of the contract and the owner has
actual knowledge of such erection or repairs, the interest of the owner in the land
shall be subject to liens created under this chapter. ...
VA. CODE ANN. § 43-20 (Repl. Vol. 1990); see Atlas Portland Cement Co. v. Main Line Re-
alty Corp., 112 Va. 7, 10-12, 70 S.E. 536, 537-39 (1911); Old Dominion Builders of Rich-
mond, Inc. v. Andrews, 10 Va. Cir. 124 (County of Henrico 1987); BURKS, PLEADING & PRAC-
TICE § 458 (4th ed. 1952).
36. Threesome, Inc. v. Contract Program Management, Inc., 18 Va. Cir. 290, 291 (County
of Fairfax 1989).
37. Feuchtenberger v. Williamson, Carroll & Saunders, 137 Va. 578, 586-87, 120 S.E. 257,
259-60 (1923).
38. E.E. Stump Well Drilling, Inc. v. Willis, 230 Va. 445, 449, 338 S.E.2d 841, 843 (1986).
39. Feuchtenberger, 137 Va. at 586, 120 S.E. at 263; Atlas Portland Cement Co., 112 Va.
at 11, 70 S.E. at 539; Case Note, Atlas Portland Cement Co. v. Main Line Realty Co., 17 VA.
L. REG. 217 (1911).
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lien can only attach to the tenant's leasehold rights.
When a mechanic's lien is asserted against an equitable estate,
its validity depends upon continued vitality of the estate. There-
fore, if the tenant's leasehold rights in the property against which
the lien is sought have already been extinguished due to a default,
a claimant's mechanic's lien cannot attach to the property.40 The
Supreme Court of Virginia is in accord with the majority of the
jurisdictions which have addressed this issue.
B. General Contractor
The term "general contractor" includes any "contractors, labor-
ers, mechanics, and persons furnishing materials, who contract di-
rectly with the owner." '42 By definition, the owner and the general
contractor cannot be the same entity or person and there may be
more than one general contractor on a project.43 The general con-
tractor may, however, be regarded as the "alter ego" of the
owner.
44
An owner may successfully defend against a contractor's
mechanic's lien suit on the ground that the contractor failed to ob-
tain a license from the State Board of Contractors, if the contrac-
tor had actual knowledge of the requirement to obtain a contrac-
tor's license and failed to procure the license.46
40. Feuchtenberger, 137 Va. at 584, 120 S.E. at 261; see Carter v. Keeton, 112 Va. 307,
309, 71 S.E. 554, 555 (1911); see also ULRICH, supra note 27, §§ 2-4, at 20.
41. Uni-Build Corp. v. Colorado Seminary, 650 P.2d 1300 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982); Accurate
Constr. Co. v. Dobbs House, Inc., 154 Ga. App. 605, 269 S.E.2d 494 (1980); Annotation,
Enforceability of Mechanics' Lien Attached to Leasehold Estate Against Landlord's Fee,
74 A.L.R.3d 330 (1976); Annotation, Lessee as Agent of Lessor Within Contemplation of
Mechanics' Lien, 79 A.L.R. 962 (1932).
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-1 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
43. Northern Va. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. J.B. Kendall Co., 205 Va. 136, 143, 135 S.E.2d 178,
183-84 (1964); see, e.g., West Alexandria Properties, Inc. v. First Va. Mortgage & Real Es-
tate Inv. Trust, 221 Va. 134, 139-40, 267 S.E.2d 149, 151-52 (1980); Merchants & Mechanics
Sav. Bank v. Dashiell, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 616, 621 (1874).
44. In re County Green Ltd. Partnership, 438 F. Supp 701, 704-07 (W.D. Va. 1977), rev'd,
604 F.2d 290 (4th Cir. 1979).
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-1115 (Cum. Supp. 1990); see also J.W. Woolard Mechanical &
Plumbing, Inc. v. Jones Dev. Corp., 235 Va. 333, 334, 367 S.E.2d 501, 502 (1988); Clark v.
Saunders, 13 Va. Cir. 11 (County of Washington 1987).
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C. Subcontractors, Materialmen, Laborers and Other Lower Tier
Contractors
The term "subcontractor" includes any "contractors, laborers,
mechanics, and persons furnishing materials, who do not contract
with the owner but with the general contractor. '46 A particular
claimant may, by definition, be a general contractor and a subcon-
tractor on the same project. A sub-subcontractor is one who fur-
nishes or supplies labor or material under a contract directly with
a subcontractor.47 Any person who furnishes material or performs
labor under a contract directly with a sub-subcontractor is not en-
titled to a lien under Title 43 of the Virginia Code.48 In short, the
statutory remedy is available only to the top three tiers of persons
providing labor or material to a particular project. If a subcontrac-
tor is a "mere instrumentality" or, in essence, the same party, it is
arguable that a person supplying material or performing labor
under a contract directly with a sub-subcontractor could be ele-
vated a tier, thus creating lien rights.49
D. Mechanic's Lien Claimant
The lien claimant must be the individual or entity that entered
into the contract underlying the particular claim. 50 A memoran-
dum of mechanic's lien is necessary to perfect a lien and will be
invalid where the memorandum names as the claimant an entity
other than that entering into the underlying contract.51 In addi-
tion, a memorandum of mechanic's lien which fails to correctly
name the claimant does not substantially comply with the statutes
"because it does not provide sufficient notice as to the identity of
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-1 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
47. The term "sub-subcontractor" is not defined in the Virginia Code. However, a form of
a memorandum of mechanic's lien claimed by sub-subcontractor is set forth in VA. CODE
ANN. § 43-10.
48. ULRICH, supra note 27, at 11-12.
49. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 213 Va. 531, 536-37, 193
S.E.2d 678, 682-83 (1973). Since a sub-sub-subcontractor is not entitled to claim the benefit
of a mechanic's lien, it is possible for the general contractor or owner to orchestrate the
"tiers" or "chains" of contractors and subcontractors such that the owner or general con-
tractor may intentionally cut off a sub-sub-subcontractor's mechanic's lien rights.
50. See United Masonry, Inc. v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 233 Va. 476, 480-81, 357 S.E.2d 509,
512 (1987).
51. Production Servs. Corp. v. Vasquez, 16 Va. Cir. 371 (County of Fairfax 1989); VA.
CODE ANN. § 43-4 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
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the claimant.
'52
E. Architects, Engineers and Surveyors
Architects and engineers are entitled to liens under certain cir-
cumstances.53 In order for architects or engineers to claim the ben-
efit of a mechanic's lien, they must (1) put their labor into plans
for the erection of a building; and (2) actually supervise its erec-
tion. 4 Surveying services are eligible for mechanics' liens under
two possible statutory characterizations. If the services are re-
quired for the improvement of the grounds they are considered
"material" and are lienable5 In the alternative, the providing of
surveying services constitutes "labor" and is lienable under a re-
lated statute. 6 Thus surveying can be considered either a "mate-
rial" or "labor" giving rise to a lien.57
F. Utility and Paving Contractors
"Any person providing labor or materials for the installation of
streets, sanitary sewers or water lines for the purpose of providing
access or service to the individual lots in a development or for con-
dominium units" has alienable interest.58 The statute appears to
52. Vasquez, 16 Va. Cir. at 373.
53. See Cain v. Rea, 159 Va. 446, 166 S.E. 478 (1932).
54. Id. at 451, 166 S.E. at 480; see also Annotation, Architects' Services as Within
Mechanics' Lien Statute, 28 A.L.R.3d 1014, 1032 (1969).
55. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-2 (Repl. Vol. 1990). "[S]urveying ... required for the improve-
ment of the grounds upon which such building or structure is situated is a 'material' giving
rise to a lien." Id.
56. Id. § 43-3. "All persons performing labor or furnishing materials. . . for the construc-
tion ... of any building ... shall have a lien . . . ." Id.
57. Cain, 159 Va. at 451, 166 S.E. at 480; Dewberry v. Leesburg Real Estate Dev. Corp.,
Ch. No. 112292 (County of Fairfax 1990); Annotation, Surveyor's Work as Giving Rights to
Mechanics' Lien, 35 A.L.R.3d 1391 (1971).
58. Section 43-3(b) of the Code of Virginia 'provides:
Any person providing labor or materials for the installation of streets, sanitary sewers
or water lines for the purpose of providing access or service to the individual lots in a
development or condominium units as defined in § 55-79.41(d) or under the Horizon-
tal Property Act (formerly §§ 55-79.1 through 55.79-38) shall have a lien on each
individual lot in the development for that fractional part of the total cost of such
labor or materials as is obtained by using 'one' as the numerator and the number of
lots as the denominator and in the case of a condominium on each individual unit in
an amount computed by reference to the liability of that unit for common expenses
appertaining to that condominium pursuant to § 55-79.38(c); provided, however, no
such lien shall be valid as to any lot or condominium unit unless the person providing
such labor or materials shall, prior to the sale of such lot or condominium unit, file
with the clerk of the circuit court of the jurisdiction in which such land lies a docu-
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apply only to lots in a development or to condominium units to be
used for residential purposes. However, the statute is ambiguous
on this point and the lien claimant should file a disclosure state-
ment when working on lots in a commercial "development" or con-
dominium units that are intended for commercial uses.
In order for the mechanic's lien to be valid under these circum-
stances, the lien claimant must: (1) file a disclosure statement prior
to the sale of the lot or condominium unit against which the lien is
sought and (2) file the memorandum of mechanic's lien pursuant
to the requirements of Title 43 of the Virginia Code .5 The disclo-
sure statement should be filed before the prospective claimant
commences work. If any lots are conveyed prior to the filing of the
disclosure statement, the claimant loses his lien rights for a frac-
tional amount of the claim in proportion to the number of lots
conveyed.
A claimant who provides "off-lot" improvements may also file a
mechanic's lien under Virginia Code section 43-3(a).6 0 A contrac-
tor's lien rights cannot be extended to land upon which he per-
formed no work.' 1 In Rosser v. Cole, 2 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia noted that "the framers of the statutory scheme were careful
not to extend a builder's lien rights beyond the 'building or struc-
ture' upon which he had worked," because they wanted to "mini-
mize danger to purchasers without notice [of the lien] and other
innocent third parties.""3
ment setting forth a full disclosure of the nature of the lien to be claimed, the amount
claimed against each lot or condominium unit and a description of the development
or condominium, and shall, thereafter, comply with all other applicable provisions of
this chapter. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to prevent the filing of a
mechanic's lien under the provisions of subsection (a) hereof.
VA. CODE ANN. § 43-3(b).
For example: A townhouse development consists of 50 lots and the claimant'is owed
$50,000 for utility or paving work performed in the development. Assuming none of the lots
have been sold prior to the claimant filing the disclosure statement required by VA. Conk
ANN. § 43-3(b), the claimant must file an individual lien against each of the 50 lots claiming
an amount of $1,000 or a single lien that lists all 50 lots and allocates $1,000 to each of the
lots.
59. Id.
60. Id. Section 43-3(a) of the Code of Virginia provides that a claimant "shall have a lien
...upon such building or structure, and so much land therewith as shall be necessary for
the convenient use and enjoyment thereof." Id. § 43-3(a).
61. Id. § 43-2; see also Rosser v. Cole, 237 Va. 572, 577, 379 S.E.2d 323, 326-27 (1989)(a
lien would not be created unless another provision of the Code allowed it since the claimant
did not do any work on the lots).
62. 237 Va. 572, 379 S.E.2d 323 (1989).
63. Id. at 576, 379 S.E.2d at 326.
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If a subdivision road builder or utility contractor fails to appor-
tion the lien or fails to file the disclosure statement as required by
section 43-3(b) of the Code of Virginia, the claimant "is limited to
the traditional lien rights conferred by § 43-3(a) . . . [which] grants
him no lien rights beyond the confines of the road or streets on
which he worked."64 In Rosser, an owner contended that the con-
tractor's mechanic's lien was invalid because the contractor sought
"a blanket lien for the total value of his services upon the entire
property" since he failed "to apportion the amount claimed [in his
memorandum] among. . . individual lots as mandated by Virginia
Code section 43-3(b). '""e The court held that the contractor's lien
was an invalid "extraterritorial lien" because the claimant pur-
ported to "cover" property to which his lien rights did not
extend.6
IV. THE PERFECTION OF A MECHANIC'S LIEN
A. The Ninety-Day Rule
In order to perfect a mechanic's lien, a claimant must file in the
clerk's office a memorandum of mechanic's lien containing "the
names of the owners of the property sought to be charged, and of
the claimant of the lien, the amount and consideration of his claim,
and the time. ' s7 While all persons are "deemed to have notice" of
the mechanic's lien from the time the memorandum of mechanic's
lien is recorded and indexed, the lien is actually perfected upon
filing. Although the lien may be filed within the prescribed time,
the clerk may not record it until several days or weeks later in
some jurisdictions.
The memorandum of mechanic's lien must be filed within
"ninety days from the last day of the month in which [the claim-
ant] last perform[ed] labor or furnish[ed] material, but in no event
later than ninety days from the time such building or structure
64. Id. at 578, 379 S.E.2d at 326-27.
65. Id. at 574-75, 379 S.E.2d at 324-25.
66. Id. at 578, 379 S.E.2d at 326-27.
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-4 (Repl. Vol. 1990). Section 43-4 provides, in part, that:
[ilt shall be the duty of the Clerk in whose office such memorandum shall be filed as
herein before provided to record and index the same as provided in § 43-4.1, in the
name as well of the claimant of the lien as of the owner of the property, and from the
time of such recording and indexing all persons shall be deemed to have notice
thereof.
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. .. is completed, or the work thereon otherwise terminated." 68
The later date "qualifies and limits" the former. 69 Unless the "lien
is perfected within the proper time and in the proper manner as
outlined by the statutes, it is lost" and the court has no power to
enforce it.7o Further, the prescribed time period is ninety days, not
three months, and "[w]hen the last day for filing a memorandum
of mechanic's lien falls on a Saturday, it may be filed on the fol-
lowing Monday."'
1
The time limitations provided in Virginia Code section 43-4 are
a trap for the unwary. In order to avoid questions being raised as
to whether the lien was perfected in a timely manner, the lien
claimant should file the lien well within the prescribed ninety-day
period. This will insure that the lien is filed, recorded and indexed
within the statutory period. The claimant should also make sure
that the proper filing fee is paid at the time the lien is submitted
for recordation because the clerk may refuse to record the lien un-
til the full amount of the filing fee is paid.71 Since many lien claim-
ants wait until the last day to file the lien, it is particularly critical
that this administrative detail not be overlooked.
The general contractor and any subcontractors or sub-subcon-
tractors who furnish material or labor at or near the completion of
the building or structure may be subject when filing their liens to
the measuring period commencing upon the completion of the
building or structure rather than to the ninety-day period from the
last day of the month in which they did work.7 3 In practice, since
most claimants wait until the day before the limitations period ex-
pires to perfect the memorandum of mechanic's lien; however, the
lien claimant should avoid the "end of the month mentality" and
not assume that the measuring period that commences ninety days
from the last day of the month in which the claimant worked will
always be applicable. Frequently, construction that is abandoned
or "otherwise terminated" prior to completion of the project will
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-4 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
69. Campbell v. Lanier, 12 Va. Cir. 85, 86 (County of Spotslyvania 1987).
70. Wallace v. Brumback, 177 Va. 36, 46, 12 S.E.2d 801, 811 (1941).
71. A.E. Tate Lumber Co. v. First Gen. Servs. of Richmond, Inc., 12 Va. Cir. 135 (County
of Chesterfield 1988).
72. Section 43-4.1 of the Code of Virginia provides that memoranda and notices of liens
are to be recorded in deed books and indexed in the general index of deeds.
73. If a subcontractor last performed or furnished materials on November 15 and the
structure was completed on November 15, the claimant would have ninety days from No-
vember 15 to perfect its lien rather that ninety days from the last day of November.
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trigger the commencement of the ninety-day period from the date
the work on the building or structure is terminated. The prudent
contractor should monitor progress of the construction project,
particularly where the contractor worked early in the month and
should not assume that the measuring period to file a mechanic's
lien will commence on the last day of the month in which he
worked.
"A mechanics' lien, although a statutory creation, necessarily has
its foundation in a contract, . . . and it is a contractor's perform-
ance under the contract that gives rise to the inchoate lien."74
Hence, the lien must correspond with the contract. 5 Where an
owner contracts with a general contractor for labor and materials
in phases, each of the contracts represent an independent under-
taking for separate and distinct compensation."8
"A running account generally constitutes but one cause of action
and cannot be divided into separate claims so as to provide a basis
for several actions. '7 7 Where materials and labor are furnished for
the construction of a building or structure as they are ordered from
time-to-time and not in fulfillment of a single contract, the limita-
tion period for perfecting a lien begins to run against each item at
the time it is furnished. If the materials were furnished under a
single contract, the items of account would be continuous and the
mechanic's lien claimant would have to file the lien within the
ninety-day limitations periods.75 On the other hand, if the several
items, or any of them, are furnished under separate contracts, such
as a running or open account, but not forming one continuous
course of dealing, the lien would have to be filed within the ninety-
day limitations period from the date of the last item under each
independent contract or invoice. 9 Virginia law conforms with the
majority of the jurisdictions that have considered the issue of con-
tinuous or separate contracts.80 Extra work not covered or contem-
74. United Masonry, Inc. v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 233 Va. 476, 480, 357 S.E.2d 509, 512
(1987); accord Rosser v. Cole, 237 Va. 572, 576, 379 S.E.2d 323, 325 (1989).
75. Sergeant v. Denby, 87 Va. 206, 208, 12 S.E. 402, 402 (1890).
76. United Masonry, 233 Va. at 481, 357 S.E.2d at 512; Richmond College v. Scott-Nuck-
ols Co., 124 Va. 333, 336, 98 S.E. 1, 2 (1919).
77. Deal v. C.E. Nix & Son, Inc., 206 Va. 57, 60, 14 S.E.2d 683, 686 (1965).
78. Bank v. Trigg Co., 106 Va. 327, 339-40, 56 S.E. 158, 169 (1907); Osborne v. Big Stone
Gap Colliery Co., 96 Va. 58, 66, 30 S.E. 446, 449 (1898) (court held that a running account
"where nothing to the contrary appears, is to be considered as falling due at the date of its
last item"); VA. CODE ANN. § 43-4 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
79. Trigg Co., 106 Va. at 339, 56 S.E. at 162.
80. Southern Lumber Co. v. Riley, 224 Ark. 298, -, 273 S.W.2d 848, 850 (1954); Cal-
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plated by the original contract, though performed by the same gen-
eral contractor, is considered a separate and distinct transaction in
a controversy between the owner and the subcontractor, and a sep-
arate ninety-day measuring period would exist.81
The "ninety-day periods" represent the maximum time within
which the claimant must perfect the lien. From the claimant's per-
spective, however, it may be wise to perfect the lien long before the
expiration of the relevant statutory period. If the claimant files the
memorandum of mechanic's lien early in the statutory period while
the owner is still receiving "draws" from the construction lender or
before a closing of the property subject to the lien occurs, this sig-
nificantly enhances the potential that the claimant's lien will be
satisfied without the necessity of filing a suit to enforce the lien. In
addition, if there are any unresolved issues or defects that could
render the lien invalid, the claimant should consider perfecting the
mechanic's lien and simultaneously filing and serving the bill to
enforce the lien, along with interrogatories and requests for admis-
sions or other forms of discovery early enough so that the answers
to the bill and discovery are due before the expiration of the appli-
cable ninety-day period. This is advisable since any defects in the
memorandum of mechanic's lien must be cured within the statu-
tory period.
The discovery should be designed to uncover any defects in the
lien so as to allow the claimant time to file an amended memoran-
dum of mechanic's lien before the expiration of the limitations pe-
riod. From the defense lawyer's perspective, if a defective memo-
randum of mechanic's lien is filed and is not cured by amendment
prior to the time the limitations period expires, the case is essen-
tially over. An improperly perfected memorandum of mechanic's
lien may be attacked and removed before the claimant sues to en-
force the lien by filing a petition under Virginia Code section 43-
17.1.82
trider v. Isberg, 148 Md. 657, -, 130 A. 53, 56 (1925); Mound City Supply Co. v. Woodland
Dev. Corp., 414 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967); Regent Waist Co. v. V.O.J. Morrison
Dep't Store Co., 88 W. Va. 303, -, 106 S.E. 712, 715 (1921).
81. Schrieber v. Citizens Bank of Norfolk, 99 Va. 257, 260, 38 S.E. 134, 135 (1901).
82. Section 43-17.1 of the Code of Virginia provides:
Any party, having an interest in real property against which a lien has been filed,
may, upon a showing of good cause, petition the court of equity having jurisdiction
wherein the building, structure, other property, or railroad is located to hold a hear-
ing to determine the validity of any perfected lien on the property. After reasonable
notice to the lien claimant and any party to whom the benefit of the lien would inure
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The time of completion of the building or structure as described
in the Virginia Code section 43-4 may be fixed by contract (i.e.,
upon issuance of a Certificate of Substantial Completion) even
though there are "finishing touches" remaining to be done. 3 Such
provisions may be binding upon subcontractors claiming through a
general contractor."4 Abandonment of the project by the owner or
general contractor will generally constitute the building or struc-
ture being "otherwise terminated" as defined in Virginia Code sec-
tion 43-4 for purposes of measuring the limitations period. 5 In ad-
dition, the bankruptcy or insolvency of the owner will "otherwise
terminate" the work.88 Courts in other jurisdictions also deem ter-
mination the equivalent of completion. 8 7 Mere sale of a building
during construction however, does not "otherwise terminate" the
work.88 "The sale of the improved property by the owner-developer
to a third-party purchaser does not extinguish a lien and has no
effect on whether a lien can be filed by a person furnishing labor or
materials to the owner-developer."' "Confusion exists in the
and who has given notice as provided in § 43-18 of the Code of Virginia, the court
shall hold a hearing and determine the validity of the lien. If the court finds that the
lien is invalid, it shall forthwith order that the memorandum or notice of lien be
removed from record.
VA. CODE ANN. § 43-17.1 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
83. Trustees Franklin St. Church v. Davis, 85 Va. 193, 196, 7 S.E. 245, 247 (1888) (even
though "punch list items" are not finished, a building may be deemed completed); Smith v.
Adams, 11 Va. Cir. 543, 544 (County of Rockingham 1984). But see Calcourt Properties, Inc.
v. Barnes Constr. Co., 20 Va. Cir. 202 (County of Chesterfield 1990) (filing date under VA.
CODE ANN. § 43-4 may be extended where repair work was: (1) done in good faith; (2) within
a reasonable time; (3) in pursuance of the terms of the contract; and, (4) necessary to a
finished job).
84. Maddux v. Buchanan, 121 Va. 102, 109, 92 S.E. 830, 831-32 (1917).
85. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-4 (Repl. Vol. 1990); see also Mills v. Moore's Super Stores, 217
Va. 276, 279, 227 S.E.2d 719, 722 (1976) (although a contractor abandoned a project when it
was only partially completed, his work was considered "otherwise terminated"); Northern
Va. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. J.B. Kendall Co., 205 Va. 136, 147, 135 S.E.2d 178, 186 (1964).
86. Moore's Super Stores, 217 Va. at 279, 227 S.E.2d at 722; J.B. Kendall Co., 205 Va. at
148, 135 S.E.2d at 186; Furst-Kerber Co. v. Wells, 116 Va. 95, 81 S.E. 22 (1914).
87. See Hayward Lumber & Inv. Co. v. Graham, 104 Ariz. 103, -, 449 P.2d 31, 33 (1972);
Lamoreaux v. Andersch, 128 Minn. 261, -, 150 N.W. 908, 912 (1932); Stark-Davis Co. v.
Fellows, 129 Or. 281, -, 277 P. 110, 112 (1929)(required intent to cease operations perma-
nently with knowledge of abandonment by lien claimant); see also Byrne v. Forbes, 90 Kan.
557, -, 135 P. 598, 598 (1926) (subsequent completion of a building by an owner after
cessation of labor by the contractor or by his abandonment of his contract did not operate
as an extension of time for the filing by subcontractors of liens claimed under and created
by the original contractor); Tindell Home Center, Inc. v. Union People's Bank, 543 S.W.2d
843, 845 (Tenn. 1976).
88. Hadrup v. Sale, 201 Va. 421, 425, 11 S.E.2d 405, 407 (1959).
89. R.C. Lee Carpet & Tile, Inc. v. Core Constr. Corp., 12 Va. Cir. 159, 162 (County of
Spotsylvania 1988) (quoting JOINT COMM. ON CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., MECHANICS' LIENS
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owner-developer area because the construction industry considers
the owner-developer to be a general contractor whereas under Title
43 he is an owner. . . .Payment by the third-party purchaser to
the owner-developer [at closing] is not payment by an owner to a
general contractor. .. .
B. The 150-Day Rule
"The lien claimant may file any number of. . .memoranda [of
liens] but no memorandum. . . shall include sums due for labor or
materials furnished more than 150 days prior to the last day on
which labor was performed or materials furnished to the job pre-
ceding the filing of such memorandum."'" The 150-day look-back
period for labor and materials to be included in a memorandum of
mechanic's lien relates to the last day on which labor was per-
formed or material furnished to the job. The limitation does not
refer to the date the memorandum was filed.2 Specifically, the
measuring date is the last day on which labor was performed or
materials furnished, not the last day of the month in which labor
was performed or materials furnished or the date the project was
abandoned or otherwise terminated.
C. Notice Requirements
A subcontractor is required to give notice to the owner of his
mechanic's lien claim." A sub-subcontractor is required to give no-
tice to the owner and the general contractor that a lien has been
perfected.9 4 A general contractor is not required to give notice to
the owner, but rather may rely on the constructive notice which
arises upon the recordation of the memorandum of mechanic's
lien. 9 5 Service of the notices may be delivered by the sheriff, or by
certified or registered mail with return receipt.9 6 There is no statu-
tory time period within which the claimant must give the notice of
(1978)); see also Hadrup, 201 Va. at 424-25, Ill S.E.2d at 407; VA. CODE ANN. § 43-4 (Repl.
Vol. 1990).
90. R.C. Lee Carpet & Tile, Inc., 12 Va. Cir. at 161-62.
91. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-4 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
92. See 1986-87 Report of the Attorney General of Virginia 228.
93. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-7, -8, -14.1 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
94. Id. at §§ 43-9, -10, -14.1.
95. Id. at §§ 43-4; Sands v. Stagg, 105 Va. 444, 449, 52 S.E. 633, 635 (1906).
96. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-14.1 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
the mechanic's lien 7 Notice, however, must be given prior to ob-
taining a judgment. It is wise to give the statutory notice on the
same date the claimant files the memorandum of mechanic's lien,
since the date the owner or general contractor receives notice of
the lien is the measuring date to determine the extent to which the
owner is indebted to the general contractor or the general contrac-
tor is indebted to the subcontractor.98 The status of accounts be-
tween the owner and general contractor or between the general
contractor and the subcontractor establishes the amount for which
a claimant can recover by its lien.
D. Slander of Title
The filing of a memorandum of mechanic's lien is a "judicial
proceeding" which may entitle the claimant to the defense of abso-
lute privilege in a suit for slander of title. In light of Donohoe Con-
struction Co. v. Mount Vernon Associates,99 the defense lawyer
should only consider a slander of title suit against a mechanic's
lien claimant where no good faith basis for claiming a mechanic's
lien exists or where the claimant files the lien with the intent to
cause injury, financial or otherwise, to the owner or under similar
egregious circumstances. Under Donohoe Construction Co., a
memorandum of mechanic's lien is a "judicial proceeding" but any
fraudulent misrepresentation in the memorandum could be
grounds for a perjury charge against the claimant."0 Where a sub-
contractor files a mechanic's lien before completion of the work, he
may be liable for damages for injuries sustained by the contractor.
In such an action, however, the suit should charge some special
damage to the contractor. 101
97. Mills v. Moore's Super Stores, 217 Va. 276, 279, 227 S.E.2d 719, 722 (1976) ("the risk
of losing his lien is properly imposed upon the dilatory subcontractor").
98. VA. CODE: ANN. §§ 43-7, -9 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
99. 235 Va. 531, 538-39, 369 S.E.2d 857, 861 (1988); ef. JGS Constr., Inc. v. Mechanicsville
Concrete, Inc., 18 Va. Cir. 313, 313-14 (County of Chesterfield 1989) (malicious prosecution
may lie if a claimant wrongfully or maliciously files a lien).
100. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-434 (Repl. Vol. 1990); T. WOLF & T. KAINE, MECHANIC'S LIENS
AND SURETY BONDS UNDER VIRGINIA LAW § 13(c) (1989).
101. Moore v. Rolin, 89 Va. 107, 111, 15 S.E. 520, 521 (1892). Since the statute in effect
when this case was decided provided that the lien could not be filed until the completion of
the work, Moore may be of little precedential value.
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E. Forfeiture of Lien
"Any person who shall, with [the] intent to mislead, include in
his memorandum of lien work not performed upon, or materials
not furnished for, the property described in his memorandum shall
thereby forfeit [his lien rights]. '' 1°2 In short, a lienor may not en-
force a lien against one lot or project for the cost of labor or mate-
rial furnished on another. The defense lawyer may consider invok-
ing the forfeiture provision, section 43-23.1 of the Code of Virginia,
when it appears that the claimant has included amounts in its lien
against Blackacre, which are attributable to labor performed or
materials furnished on Whiteacre. A contractor may complete his
work on Whiteacre and allow his lien rights to expire, but continue
to work on Blackacre and later file a lien against Blackacre for all
amounts attributable to Blackacre and Whiteacre. If this is done
with the intent to mislead, the claimant forfeits his lien rights. The
defense lawyer should be cognizant of the fact that it is frequently
difficult to prove that the inclusion of the improper amounts was
not done negligently, but rather with the intent~to mislead. 10 3
F. The Amount of the Lien
In West Alexandria Properties, Inc. v. First Virginia Mortgage
& Real Estate Investment Trust,10 4 the claimant included amounts
in the mechanic's lien attributable to work done on a road which
had been dedicated to the government and could not be subject to
a mechanic's lien. The court enforced the lien to the extent that
value had been added to the privately held property adjacent to
the public road and reduced the amount of the lien to the extent
allocable to the work done on the exempt dedicated road. 05 The
102. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-23.1 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
103. When the General Assembly amended this provision by substituting the words "with
the intent to mislead" for the word "knowingly" the amendment did not constitute a sub-
stantive change in the statute. Rather, the amendment was enacted simply to reinforce the
original legislative intent by clarifying an after-discovered semantic ambiguity. Prior to the
amendment, "knowingly" meant more than "with knowledge." Rather, "knowingly" in this
context was "an antonym of 'innocently' and a synonym of 'designedly' and 'with intent to
mislead'." First Nat'l Bank of Martinsville & Henry County v. Roy N. Ford Co., 219 Va.
942, 945, 252 S.E.2d 354, 356 (1979); see James River Bldg. Supply Co. v. Residential Inno-
vation, Inc., 20 Va. Cir. 156 (County of Chesterfield 1990) (where the facts of a case do not
establish any intent to mislead on the part of the claimant, the claimant's lien should not be
forfeited).
104. 221 Va. 134, 141, 267 S.E.2d 149, 153 (1980).
105. Id. at 142, 267 S.E.2d at 154.
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land upon which the claimant performed labor and furnished ma-
terial was sought to be impressed with a lien claiming an amount
greater than permitted by law.106 It is the traditional role of courts
reviewing a mechanic's lien suit to decide whether all or part of the
amount of the claimed lien is appropriate.107 The amount of a
mechanic's lien may be reduced where a claimant claims a greater
amount than his proof can support. 10 8 While the Supreme Court of
Virginia has shown a willingness to reduce the amount of the lien,
it will be shown later that the court will not reduce or excise the
amount of land subjected to a mechanic's lien. 109 If it can be shown
that materials for which a mechanic's lien is sought were not actu-
ally used on a project, then the lienor may not be entitled to his
lien. 1 0 Delivery of materials to a lot creates a presumption of in-
corporation into that lot which must be rebutted by the person
seeking to defeat the lien."' Arguably, the amount claimed in the
mechanic's lien should only include amounts attributable to labor
performed or materials furnished which were "permanently an-
nexed to the freehold." Intrinsic in a strict reading of the relevant
statutes is the implication that amounts attributable to tools or
certain materials which are not incorporated in the building or
structure should not be included in the lien." 2
G. Affidavit and Statement of Intent Required in Memorandum
of Mechanic's Lien
An affidavit must accompany a memorandum of mechanic's lien
and the person signing the affidavit on behalf of a corporation,
partnership or other entity claiming a mechanic's lien must state
that he is executing the lien as an agent of the entity (i.e., "John A.
106. Woodington Elec., Inc. v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 238 Va. 623, 633, 385 S.E.2d
872, 877 (1989).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 633, 385 S.E.2d at 876.
109. See infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
110. Gilman v. Ryan, 95 Va. 494, 498, 28 S.E. 875, 876 (1898). Contra Solite Masonry
Units Corp. v. Piland Constr. Co., 217 Va, 727, 731-32, 232 S.E.2d 759, 762 (1977). The
supplier delivered materials to the job site and believed the goods were to be used in the
project located on that site. The court recognized the validity of the lien even though the
materials were not actually used on that project. Id.
111. Thomas Somerville Co. v. Broyhill, 200 Va. 358, 362, 105 S.E.2d 824, 828 (1958).
112. But see VA. CODE ANN. § 43-2 (Repl. Vol. 1990) (stating, in part, that "the reasonable
rental or use value of equipment . ..shall be deemed to be materials furnished for the
improvement of such building or structure and permanently annexed to the freehold").
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Smith, President and Agent")." 3 If the affidavit is signed by the
secretary or a credit manager of the corporation, there must be a
special authorization permitting the person signing to execute affi-
davits or the lien may be held invalid.1 4 If an affidavit omits the
amount claimed, but the memorandum of mechanic's lien includes
the amount, the lien may be valid.", 5 The claimant must include a
"statement declaring his intention to claim the benefit of the
lien." 16 Because mechanics' liens are strictly construed, the failure
of a claimant to include a statement declaring his intention to
claim the benefit of the lien in the memorandum of mechanic's lien
could render the lien invalid.
17
H. Lower-Tier Contractors May Rely Upon Lien of General
Contractor
The perfected lien of a general contractor on any building or
structure inures to the benefit of any subcontractor or sub-subcon-
tractor who has not perfected a lien on the same." 8 If the subcon-
tractor or sub-subcontractor intends to rely upon the general con-
tractor's lien, he must "give written notice of his claim against the
general contractor, or subcontractor, as the case may be, to the
owner or his agent before the amount of the lien is actually paid
off or discharged."" 9 Therefore, failure to give notice in writing to
the owner or his agent before the general contractor's lien is paid
off is an affirmative defense to the claim of the subcontractor or
sub-subcontractor who relies upon and attempts to enforce the lien
of the general contractor. 120
113. See Clement v. Adams Bros.-Payne Co., 113 Va. 547, 553, 75 S.E. 294, 296 (1912)
(president of corporation not necessarily agent; mechanic's lien held invalid); Threesome,
Inc. v. Contract Program Management, Inc., 18 Va. Cir. 290, 292 (County of Fairfax 1989)
(memorandum signed by "Surcle as President" and affidavit signed by "Surcle as claimant"
held defective). But see John Diebold & Sons' Stone Co. v. Tatterson, 115 Va. 766, 771-73,
80 S.E. 585, 587 (1914) (court will look to paper to which affidavit is attached to determine
sufficiency of affidavit).
114. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-7 (Repl. Vol. 1989)("An affidavit filed for a corporation or other
entity may be made by its president, vice-president, general manager, cashier, treasurer, a
director or attorney without any special authorization therefor, or by any person authorized
by a majority of its stockholders, directors, partners or members to execute affidavits.").
115. Weyant Bros., Inc. v. Calvert Constr. Co., 18 Va. Cir. 307, 308-09 (County of Fairfax
1989).
116. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-4 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
117. Threesome, Inc., 18 Va. Cir. at 290.
118. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-18 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
119. Id.
120. See Shenandoah Valley R.R. v. Miller, 80 Va. 821, 826 (1885).
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V. JOINT OR BLANKET MECHANIC'S LIEN
A joint or blanket memorandum of mechanic's lien is defined as
a lien against two or more buildings or structures on separate par-
cels of land and which fails to allocate the specific amount or value
of the labor or materials furnished by the claimant to each specific
building or structure. 2' A memorandum of mechanic's lien should
contain a statement of the amount claimed for work done and
materials furnished for improvement of the identical lot upon
which the lien is claimed and a description of that very property.
122
In Virginia, a memorandum of mechanic's lien, asserting a single
joint or blanket lien against several separate and distinct lots or
parcels of land en masse, without apportionment to each lot, is
valid only under the following circumstances:
(1) There is a single contract between the owner and the
mechanic's lien claimant for the claimant to supply all of the labor
or materials for all of the buildings or structures on the various
lots for a single, unapportioned, lump sum price; 123 and,
(2) the claimant is unable to specify the amount of labor or
materials supplied to each separate lot; 24 and,
(3) There are no other outstanding liens on the property subject
to the lien; that is, only the rights of the owner and the mechanic's
lien claimant are involved, and not the rights of other third-party
lienholders (e.g., noteholders and trustees under a deed of trust,
other mechanics' lien claimants).'25
121. See generally Note, Mechanic's Liens-Allocation Among Multi-Unit Projects Under
Virginia Law, 13 U. RicH. L. REv. 637 (1979).
122. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-4 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
123. Sergeant v. Denby, 87 Va. 206, 208, 12 S.E. 402, 402 (1890). An open account is not a
"single contract for an entire work" but rather a series of separate but related transactions
with prices established under each separate invoice. Withrow Lumb~r Co. v. Glasgow Inv.
Co., 101 F. 863, 865 (4th Cir. 1900); Northern Va. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. J.B. Kendall Co., 205
Va. 136, 145, 135 S.E.2d 178, 185 (1964); Plant Lipford, Inc. v. Gates & Son Co., 141 Va.
325, 329, 127 S.E. 183, 185 (1925). A "unit price" contract which allocates amounts attribu-
table for labor and materials furnished to each lot is not a "single contract for the entire
work." John Massey, Ch. Nos. C85-76 and C85-78 (Norfolk Cir. Ct. 1986).
124. Weaver v. Harland Corp., 176 Va. 224, 233, 10 S.E.2d 547, 550 (1940). However, in
order to preserve its inchoate lien rights a mechanic's lien claimant has a duty to determine
the specific lot on which the materials are to be furnished or the work performed. Each
invoice, delivery ticket, or work order should identify the specific lot to be improved. See
J.B. Kendall Co., 205 Va. at 145, 135 S.E.2d at 178.
125. See Sergeant, 87 Va. at 208, 12 S.E. at 402; United Masonry, Inc. v. Jefferson Mews,
Inc., 218 Va. 360, 237 S.E.2d 171 (1977).
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All three of these requirements must be met for a memorandum
asserting a joint lien to be valid. This seldom occurs. With the ex-
ception of Sergeant v. Denby,126 in cases in which the Supreme
Court of Virginia has considered the question, the court has held
that a memorandum asserting a joint or blanket lien did not con-
stitute "substantial compliance" with the Virginia statutes gov-
erning the perfection-of mechanics' liens, and therefore, the joint
liens were ruled unenforceable. 127 Several Virginia circuit courts
have addressed the joint or blanket lien issue and have uniformly
declared blanket liens to be invalid. 128 The reason that the joint or
blanket lien is prohibited under Virginia law, except in the limited
circumstances set out above, is that the lien claimant is entitled to
a lien only to the extent that the claimant has added value to the
individual lots by the investment of his labor and materials. "The
theory of the law is that credit is given to the identical building for
which the materials are furnished or upon which the work is done.
Each building represents a distinct and separate security."'1 29 In
short, Blackacre cannot be lienable for claims relating to White-
acre and vice versa. 30
Where a contract estimates or fixes the price of materials fur-
nished and work done upon each of two or more buildings on dis-
connected lots, a memorandum of lien which claims the aggregate
price as a lien upon all of the lots is not in substantial compliance
with the statutes. 13 A partial release of one of two or more parcels
from a joint lien will cause the lien against the remaining parcel or
parcels to be "released" de jure and deemed invalid, if the rights
126. 87 Va. at 209, 12 S.E. at 402.
127. United Va. Mortgage Corp. v. Haines Paving Co., 221 Va. 1047, 1050, 277 S.E.2d 187,
188 (1981); PIC Constr. Co. v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 218 Va. 915, 922-23, 241 S.E.2d 804,
808-09 (1978); Jefferson Mews, Inc., 218 Va. at 380, 237 S.E.2d at 183; Weaver, 176 Va. at
234, 10 S.E.2d at 547; Gilman v. Ryan, 95 Va. 494, 499, 28 S.E. 875, 876-77 (1898). But see
In re Thomas A. Cary, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 667, 675 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd sub nom., National
Permanent Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Virginia Concrete Co., 462 F.2d 47, aff'd, 562 F.2d 48
(4th Cir. 1977).
128. Potomac Say. Bank v. Virginia Clay Prod., Inc., 19 Va. Cir. 109, 110 (County of
Fairfax 1990); Kempsville Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Nonni Homes Co., Ch. No. Ch-11055 (City
of Va. Beach 1986); Framesticks, Inc. v. O'Neal, Ch. No. Ch-8438 (City of Va. Beach 1985);
Virginia Beach Mechanical Corp. v. Baymark Cos., Inc., Ch. No. C84-1267 (City of Norfolk
1985); Richard W. Thomas, Inc. v. Carroll W. Kennedy Assocs., Ch. No. C79-1572 (City of
Va. Beach 1979).
129. Shelton v. Ogus, 201 Va. 417, 419, 111 S.E.2d 408, 409-10 (1959) (quoting Weaver v.
Harland Corp., 176 Va. 224, 228, 10 S.E.2d 547, 548-49 (1940)).
130. Feltner v. Jung, 8 Va. Cir. 137, 141 (County of Clarke 1985).
131. Gilman, 95 Va. at 498-99, 28 S.E. at 876-77.
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of competing lien claimants could be affected. 132 Where lenders,
competing mechanics' lienors, or other third-party lien claimants
are also looking to the individual lots for security for their claims,
a mechanic's lien claimant is not allowed to release an individual
lot for an arbitrary amount unrelated to the actual amounts in-
vested by him in that lot, and enforce his lien for the remainder
owed against the unreleased lots. Otherwise, a claimant could re-
cover more by his lien on a particular lot than the claimant has
,invested in the lot and thereby deprive junior lienholders of part,
or all, of their security. 133 The fact that the structures may be
townhouses or contiguous units does not mean that they constitute
one structure; although they may have party walls, the buildings
may be constructed upon separate individual lots and therefore, a
blanket lien will be invalid.'
VI. OVERINCLUSIVE AND UNDERINCLUSIVE LIENS
A. Overinclusive Liens
If a mechanic's lien claimant attempts to assert one lien against
several parcels of land, where the mechanic did not work or add
value to all parcels against which the lien is sought, the entire lien
is rendered invalid. 3 5 In Woodington Electric Inc. v. Lincoln Sav-
ings & Loan Association,'3 6 the mechanic's lien claimant only per-
formed labor or furnished materials on two of the nine parcels in-
cluded in the property description attached to the memorandum of
mechanic's lien that was sought to be enforced. On appeal, the
court held that the lien was overinclusive and thus invalid. In
United Masonry, Inc. v. Jefferson Mews, Inc.,37 a mechanic en-
132. United Va. Mortgage Corp. v. Haines Paving Co., 221 Va. 1047, 1050, 277 S.E.2d 187,
189 (1981); PIC Constr. Co. v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 218 Va. 915, 922-23, 241 S.E.2d 804,
808-09 (1978); Weaver, 176 Va. at 233-34, 10 S.E.2d at 551;
133. See Weaver, 176 Va. at 233, 10 S.E.2d at 551.
134. Herndon Lumber & Millwork, Inc. v. C & M Constr. Co., Ch. No. 4692 (County of
Loudoun 1979).
135. Woodington Elec., Inc. v. Lincoln Say. & Loan Ass'n, 238 Va. 623, 634, 385 S.E.2d
872, 878 (1989); Winder Plumbing, Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Kanawha Trace Dev.
Partners, 19 Va. Cir. 333, 334-35 (City of Richmond 1990).
136. 238 Va. 623, 634, 385 S.E.2d 872, 878 (1989).
137. 218 Va. 360, 366, 237 S.E.2d 171, 180 (1977). One contract was for masonry work on
132 of a total of 264 condominium units. The second contract was for work on a club house
which would be a common element of the condominium regime. When the owner did not
pay, the mechanic filed one blanket lien on the entire condominium regime for the work it
had done. The lower court sustained the defendant's demurrer which charged that the lien
was invalid because it failed to apportion the total amount claimed under each of the two
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tered into two contracts with a condominium developer. Th& court
noted that because the first contract was for work only on 132
units of 264 planned units, it was manifest that there could be no
lien against the planned but unbuilt 132 units because those units
received no benefit from the work done under the first contract. 138
The court reasoned that "[t]he memorandum does not seek to se-
cure the claim to the extent that the plaintiff has added value to
the individual units worked on, but attempts to lien other property
not benefited by such work. Consequently, the memorandum fails
to substantially comply with Code section 43-3. .. ."I" Thus, in
Jefferson Mews, Inc., it was indicated, without expressly holding,
that an overinclusive lien was invalid.
The Supreme Court of Virginia also addressed the overinclusive
lien question in Rosser v. Cole.140 Rosser, the owner of a 450 acre
tract, subdivided it into seventy-seven lots which were served by a
network of subdivision streets. Rosser then entered into a contract
with Cole for general clearing and grading in connection with the
construction of the roads. Cole later filed a memorandum of
mechanic's lien against the entire 450-acre tract, although he had
done no work on any of the seventy-seven lots, but had worked
only on the roads.141 Rosser challenged the validity of the lien
under section 43-17.1 of the Code of Virginia. The trial court held
that the lien was valid.1 42 The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed
and reasoned that "[b]ecause the contractor's memorandum of
mechanic's lien failed to correspond with his contract, failed to de-
scribe the land and improvements upon which his lien rights ex-
isted, and purported to cover property to which his lien rights did
not extend, it was invalid.'
43
The proper description of lienable property relates to the overin-
clusiveness issues. Section 43-15 of the Code of Virginia states that
"[n]o inaccuracy. . . in the description of the property to be cov-
ered by the lien shall invalidate the lien. 144 "The property to be
covered by the lien is the property on which the mechanic has
contracts. Id.
138. Id. at 378, 237 S.E.2d. at 182.
139. Id.
140. 237 Va. 572, 379 S.E.2d 323 (1989).
141. Id. at 573-74, 379 S.E.2d at 324.
142. Id. at 574, 379 S.E.2d at 324.
143. Id. at 578, 379 S.E.2d at 327.
144. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-15 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
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worked and none other.' 1 5 If the mechanic worked on parcel A
but imposed a lien on parcels A, B and C, the Supreme Court of
Virginia does not consider that an inaccuracy in describing Parcel
A.146 In the view of the court, "such a description improperly
reaches beyond the required description of the property to be cov-
ered by the lien to include property which, in law, cannot be cov-
ered by the lien."'14  A claimant may not file an overinclusive lien
and then leave it to the trial court to excise any excess property.
The mechanic must place his lien only upon the property on which
he worked. 14  The property description in a memorandum of
mechanic's lien must reasonably identify the property covered by
the lien. " 9 The Supreme Court of Virginia has found the "brief
description of the property" to be sufficient where the claimant in-
cluded the street address and made reference to a deed book and
page number of an instrument in the clerk's office where the prop-
erty was listed.150 However, describing the property to be covered
by the lien in this manner is a very dangerous practice since 1he
deed may include multiple parcels; arguably, by merely referencing
the deed book and page number, the claimant has attempted to
lien all parcels shown on the plat. If the claimant has not worked
on all of the parcels, then the lien may be held invalid.15'




148. Id.; see Homecraft Corp. v. Criswell & Assoc., 6 Va. Cir. 412 (County of Spotsylvania,
1986) (claimant intended to lien Lot 231, but due to a scrivener's error, liened Lot 230; this
was fatal defect and lien was held invalid.). Where a claimant liened all forty lots which
constituted a city block but only performed labor and furnished materials for the improve-
ment of a building or structure located on a portion of the city block, the lien was declared
invalid. Masterclean, Inc. v. Spinnazolla Sys., Inc., Ch. No. 19226-S (City of Newport News
1990). Where a subcontractor used the name of a farm which had been subdivided into eight
different lots and did not describe the particular lot upon which the subcontractor per-
formed the work, the court ruled that the lien overburdened the property and was invalid.
Jung v. Valley Redi-Mix Co., 14 Va. Cir. 344 (County of Clarke 1989). If the lien overbur-
dens the property, then the liens cannot be saved by a subsequent release of the
overburdened property. Woodington Elec., Inc., 238 Va. at 634, 385 S.E.2d at 878; see also
Bay Tile Corp. v. Blue Phoenix Corp., Ch. No. C85-355 (City of Norfolk 1985); Woodington
Elec., Inc. v. Blue Phoenix Corp., Ch. No. C85-399 (City of Norfolk 1985); G & V Gen.
Contractors, Inc. v. Blue Phoenix Corp., Ch. No. C85-435 (City of Norfolk 1985); Waterfront
Marine Constr., Inc. v. Blue Phoenix Corp., Ch. No. C85-337 (City of Norfolk 1985).
149. Taylor v. Netherwood, 91 Va. 88, 91-92, 20 S.E. 888, 889 (1895).
150. Penrod & Stauffer Bldg. Sys. v. Metro Printing & Mailing Servs., Inc., 229 Va. 150,
153, 326 S.E.2d 662, 664 (1985).
151. Woodington Elec., Inc., 238 Va. 623, 634, 385 S.E.2d 872, 878 (1989). A mechanic's
lien may be held invalid where the property description fails to reasonably identify whether
the claimant intends to lien an entire shopping center or just a single space within the
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B. Underinclusive Liens
A mechanic's lien may also be deemed invalid where the claim-
ant does not include all parcels of land upon which the building or
structure is located.1 52 Although there is no published authority in
Virginia directly on point, the tenor of thought of the court can be
gleaned from the cases involving overinclusive liens.' There are
also cases in other jurisdictions where a mechanic's lien has been
held invalid because the claimant failed to lien all of the land upon
which the building or structure was located.
154
VII. DEFENSES TO PERSONAL LIABILITY
The personal liability statute of mechanic's lien laws' 55 is grossly
underutilized by contractors in Virginia either because they are
unaware of its provisions or for business reasons. A subcontractor
or sub-subcontractor "may give notice in writing to the owner or
his agent or the general contractor stating the nature and character
of his contract and the probable amount of his claim.' 56 After the
subcontractor or sub-subcontractor has completed its work and
before the expiration of thirty days from the time the building or
structure is completed or the work is otherwise terminated, the
subcontractor or sub-subcontractor must provide an account of its
claim, verified by affidavit, to the general contractor and to the
owner or his agent, as applicable. 57 According to the statute, if the
above requirements are complied with, the owner, or the general
shopping center or whether the property is within the jurisdiction of the court. Threesome,
Inc. v. Contract Program Management, 18 Va. Cir. 290, 292 (County of Fairfax 1989).
152. Annotation, Sufficiency of Notice, Claim, or Statement of Mechanics' Lien with Re-
spect to Description or Location of Real Property, 52 A.L.R.2d 12, 72-75 (1957).
153. See Woodington Elec., Inc., 238 Va. at 634, 385 S.E.2d at 878; Rosser v. Cole, 237
Va. 572, 578, 379 S.E.2d 323, 327 (1989); United Masonry, Inc. v. Jefferson Mews, Inc., 218
Va. 360, 380, 237 S.E.2d 171, 183 (1977).
154. Annotation, supra note 152, at 72-75. A lien describing the property as "lot eight (8)
and block forty-eight (48), City of Omaha" was held invalid where the evidence disclosed
that the hotel upon which the lien was sought to be enforced was constructed partly on the
above lots but also partly upon an adjoining parcel of land. Western Cornice & Mfg. Works
v. Leavenworth, 52 Neb. 418, 72 N.W. 592 (1897). A mechanic's lien was also held invalid
where the lien described the property as consisting of a building on lot 18 and 5 feet of lot
19 when in fact the building actually occupied 20 feet on lot 19 and 15 feet on lot 20. Powers
v. Brewer, 238 Ky. 579, 38 S.W.2d 466 (1931); see also Muto v. Smith, 175 Mass. 175, 55
N.E. 1041 (1900) (description held insufficient because it excluded a part of the land on
which the building was located).
155. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-11 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
156. Id.
157. Id.
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contractor, if he was the only party notified, will be personally lia-
ble to the claimant.
158
The preliminary notice stating the probable amount of the claim
must be given before or during the period the contractor is per-
forming labor or furnishing materials under the contract. If the
preliminary notice is given after the work has been completed, the
notice does not substantially comply with the statute and will not
personally bind the owner or general contractor. 59 A photocopy of
an affidavit furnished with the second notice required substantially
complies with the statute.160 The notices should specifically refer
to section 43-11 of the Virginia Code and clearly indicate that the
claimant is seeking to establish personal liability on the part of the
owner or the general contractor. The notice may be defective if it
is too courteous or equivocal.' 61 In order for the owner or general
contractor to be personally bound, the notice must be recorded
and indexed in the appropriate clerk's office or "mailed by regis-
tered or certified mail to and received by the owner or general con-
tractor upon whom personal liability is sought to be imposed.'1
6 2
The owner or general contractor shall be personally liable to the
claimant provided the claim
[D]oes not exceed the sum in which the owner is indebted to the
general contractor at the time the notice is given or may thereafter
become indebted by virtue of his contract with the general contrac-
tor, or in the case the general contractor alone is notified, the sum in
which he is indebted to the subcontractor at the time the notice is
given or may thereafter become indebted by virtue of his contract
with the general contractor.
6 3
158. Id. Section 43-11 of the Code of Virginia provides a two-step notice procedure in
order to impose personal liability upon an owner. Failure to give one of the two notices
required by the statute is fatal to a claim under the statute. Lanmor Corp. v. BM & K
Builders, Inc., Ch. No. 90-67 (County of Caroline 1990). There have been various additions
and deletions to section 43-11 and its predecessors since the statute was enacted over a
century ago. Therefore, in analyzing any decision interpreting the statute, it is necessary to
examine the specific language of the statute being construed in the particular case.
159. Staples v. Adams, Payne & Gleaves, Inc., 215 F. 322, 327 (4th Cir. 1914); Steigleder
& Son v. Allen, 113 Va. 686, 691, 75 S.E. 191, 193 (1912); Noland Co. v. Armada-Hoffier
Constr. Co., Law No. 23543-M (City of Chesapeake 1989); Robinson v. Herrell Constr. Co., 7
Va. Cir. 308, 310 (City of Winchester 1986); BURKS, supra note 35, at 895; ULRICH, supra
note 27, at 40.
160. Penrod & Stauffer Bldg. Sys. v. Metro Printing & Mailing Servs., Inc., 229 Va. 150,
154, 326 S.E.2d 662, 665 (1985).
161. See English's, Inc. v. McCrickard, 7 Va. Cir. 218 (County of Campbell 1984).
162. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-11 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
163. Id.
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It is an affirmative defense to a claim by a subcontractor against
an owner, that the owner is not indebted to the general contractor
or is indebted to the general contractor for less than the amount of
the subcontractor's claim. A claim which has been perfected under
the statute is a personal obligation of the owner. It has priority
over claims of all subcontractors who have obtained their mechan-
ics' liens without perfecting a claim under the statute."' In short, a
subcontractor, laborer or materialman who has complied with the
statutory provisions required to fix personal liability on the owner
is to be paid in full before those who claim mechanics' liens on the
property are paid.16
If the owner is compelled to complete his building or structure,
or any part thereof, undertaken by a general contractor in conse-
quence of the failure or refusal of the general contractor to do so,
the owner is entitled to deduct the amounts expended for the com-
pletion of the building or structure from the amounts for which the
owner may have become personally liable. 6 ' Likewise, the owner
has the right to guarantee the payment to a subcontractor without
notice to other creditors, and the owner is entitled to a credit for
the amount so guaranteed and can defend on this basis any
mechanics' liens filed after the guarantee. 67 A subcontractor whose
account is guaranteed is entitled to first priority in the distribution
of the owners' funds. After the amount of the subcontractor's claim
is deducted, the owner is liable only to the extent of the remaining
funds, which should be applied ratably to the liens of the other
subcontractors. 6 ' If the owner is compelled to guarantee payment
to the subcontractor, the owner is entitled, both as against the gen-
eral contractor and against other subcontractors, to deduct the
amount for which he has thus become responsible from the amount
available to pay any liens. 6 ' Other jurisdictions which have ad-
dressed this issue are in accord with Virginia law.1
70
164. Schrieber v. Citizens Bank of Norfolk, 99 Va. 257, 261-62, 38 S.E. 135, 135 (1901).
165. BURKS, supra note 35, at 896; ULRICH, supra note 27, at 41.
166. Nicholas v. Miller, 182 Va. 831, 836, 30 S.E.2d 696, 699 (1944); VA. CODE ANN. § 43-
16 (Repl. Vol. 1990); ULRICH, supra note 27, at 42.
167. Thomas & Co. v. McCauley, 143 Va. 451, 456, 130 S.E. 396, 398 (1925).
168. Nicholas, 182 Va. at 836, 30 S.E.2d at 699.
169. BURKS, supra note 35, at 897; see also Burton Lumber Co. v. Aughenbaugh, 223 Va.
491, 290 S.E.2d 853 (1982); McCauley, 143 Va. at 456, 130 S.E. at 401.
170. Annotation, Amount of Owner's Obligation Under his Guaranty of Subcontractor's
or Materialman's Account, as Deductible from Amount Otherwise Due Principal Contrac-
tor, as Against Claims of Other Subcontractors or Materialmen, 153 A.L.R. 759 (1944).
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VIII. MECHANIC'S LIEN WAIVERS
In Virginia, the right to file or enforce a mechanic's lien may be
waived in whole or in part at any time by any person entitled to
the lien.'' A contractor or materialman may waive its right to a
mechanic's lien by executing a mechanic's lien waiver. In order to
be enforceable, the lien waiver must be supported by considera-
tion.172 For example, payments received by a contractor in ex-
change for a waiver of lien rights, coupled with an inducement to a
lender to continue construction advances, may constitute sufficient
consideration for a contractor's lien waiver. 73 Sufficient considera-
tion exists if the promisee is induced by the waiver to do some-
thing that he is not legally bound to do or refrains from doing any-
thing that he has a legal right to do, or if the promisee acts in
reliance upon the waiver to his detriment. 7 4 Not only is the rule in
Virginia, but it is the majority view of the jurisdictions which have
considered the issue. 175 However, even in the absence of considera-
tion, a lien waiver may be valid where the owner has paid for the
work to which the lien waiver relates or otherwise changed his po-
sition to his detriment in reliance on the waiver. The supporting
principal for this rule is in effect one of estoppel.17 6 A "contractor's
affidavit of payment" which did not clearly state that it was a lien
waiver, did not effectively waive lien rights. 7 A lien waiver limited
to the amounts actually paid will not constitute a waiver of a con-
tractor's right to additional sums that were due as of the date of
the prior payment. A lien waiver must be express, or, if it is to be
implied, it must be established by clear and convincing evidence. 7 8
171. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-3(c) (Repl. Vol. 1990).
172. United Masonry, Inc. v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 233 Va. 476, 483, 357 S.E.2d 509, 513-14
(1987).
173. Id. at 484, 357 S.E.2d at 514.
174. Walker & LaBerge Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 206 Va. 683, 146 S.E.2d 239
(1966).
175. Beebe Constr. Corp. v. Circle R. Co., 10 Ohio App. 2d 127, 226 N.E.2d 573, 576
(1967) (where a waiver was executed in consideration of payments the owner was legally
required to make was not a bar to the assertion of a lien for any amount remaining unpaid);
see also In re Woodcrest Homes, Inc. 11 B.R. 342 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981) (payments made
by debtor to mechanic's lien claimant could not be consideration since debtor was merely
doing that which it was legally obligated to do).
176. Mid-West Engr. & Constr. Co. v. Campagna, 397 S.W.2d 616, 629 (Mo. 1965); Giam-
marino v. J.W. Caldewey Constr. Co., 72 S.W.2d 159 (Mo. App. 1934) (owner allowed credit
for $250 paid to the general contractor in reliance upon a lien waiver, but impressed a lien
in favor of the claimant against the property for the balance owed of $300).
177. McMerit Constr. Co. v. Knightsbridge Dev. Co., 235 Va. 368, 367 S.E.2d 512 (1988).
178. Id. at 374, 367 S.E.2d at 516.
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Usually, the waiver not only waives all rights to file a mechanic's
lien, but also includes an affidavit stating that all subcontractors or
materialmen contracting with the contractor have been paid in full
through the date the waiver is executed. A subcontractor or sub-
subcontractor may not be deprived of his independent lien unless
he expressly waives his lien rights, or by clear implication, agrees
to be bound by the general contractor's waiver of his lien rights.
11
A partial or final mechanic's lien waiver is usually required (1)
when the general contractor submits a requisition to the owner for
payment; (2) when an owner requests a draw on a construction
loan from a lender; and (3) when a title insurance company issues
a "date down endorsement" to insure the construction advance
made to the owner by the lender. The use of false affidavits and
lien waivers by a developer to obtain draws on a construction loan
could act as a bar to a discharge of those debts in bankruptcy.180 A
general contractor may by contract expressly waive his right to file
a mechanic's lien even before work begins; such a waiver may later
be binding upon him even if he is not paid."1 A defense lawyer
should always attempt to obtain any lien waivers executed by the
claimant through discovery or otherwise. Partial lien waivers often
can be used to reduce the amount which may be recovered under a
mechanic's lien. In the alternative, if a final lien waiver has been
executed, partial lien waivers can constitute a complete defense to
a mechanic's lien claim.
IX. DEFENSES INVOLVING THE PRIORITY OF MECHANICS' LIENS
Virginia statutory law affords no priority among mechanics' liens
except that: (1) the lien of a subcontractor shall be preferred to
that of his general contractor; (2) the liens of sub-subcontractors
are preferred to that of subcontractors; and (3) the liens of manual
laborers have priority over those of materialman to the extent of
labor performed during the thirty days immediately before the
date of the performance of the last work.1 82 Therefore, the date on
which a memorandum of mechanic's lien is perfected by recorda-
tion is irrelevant in determining the priority among several
179. Id.
180. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A); Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Pitt, Civil Action No. 90-1937-N
(E.D. Va. 1991).
181. VNB Mortgage Corp. v. Lone St. Indus., 215 Va. 366, 373, 209 S.E.2d 909, 914
(1974).
182. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-23 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
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mechanics' liens. The statutory priority among competing mechan-
ics' liens claimants becomes important where there is a limited
fund of money available for all lien claimants. For example, based
on the statutory priority of section 43-23 of the Virginia Code, an
owner could pay a lower tier lien claimant in full prior to paying
any amount to a general contractor who may have also filed a
mechanic's lien.
A mechanic's lien has a preference over other liens and encum-
brances. 83 When another lien or encumbrance is created before
the claimant commences work or furnishes materials, it does not
operate on the building until the mechanic's lien is satisfied. If the
other lien or encumbrance is created after the claimant commences
work or furnishes materials, it does not operate on the land or the
building until the mechanic's lien is satisfied. 18 4 This priority re-
flects the underlying premise of Virginia mechanic's lien law, that
the mechanic have the benefit of a lien to the extent he improves
the property. A mechanic's lien filed for the repair or improvement
of any existing building or structure is subject and subordinate to
any encumbrance against the land and building or structure of rec-
ord prior to the commencement of the improvements or repairs. s5
183. Id. § 43-21.
184. See United States Elevator Corp. v. 1616 Reminc, Ltd. Partnership, 9 Bankr. 679
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981); Crook, Homer & Co. v. Old Point Comfort Hotel, 54 F. 604 (E.D.
Va. 1893); Rust v. Indiana Flooring Co., 151 Va. 845, 145 S.E. 321 (1928); DeWitt v. Coffey,
150 Va. 365, 143 S.E. 710 (1928); Phipps v. Wise Hotel Co., 116 Va. 739, 82 S.E. 681 (1914);
Kinnier Co. v. Cofer, 13 Va. L. Reg. 238 (1927); Lyle, Virginia Mechanic's Liens: A Precari-
ous Priority, 21 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 235 (1964). A deed of trust recorded before construc-
tion work begins is entitled to priority to the extent of the property's estimated value at the
time of sale without the improvements for which the lien is claimed. Federal Land Bank v.
Clinchfield Lumber & Supply Co., 171 Va. 118, 198 S.E. 437 (1938); Hudson v. Barham, 101
Va. 63, 43 S.E. 189 (1903); Fidelity Loan & Trust Co. v. Dennis, 93 Va. 504, 25 S.E. 546
(1896).
During the 1991 session of the General Assembly of Virginia, House Joint Resolution No.
418 was offered, which established a joint subcommittee to study the existing mechanic's
lien laws. The priority of mechanics' liens over liens securing construction loans was one of
the concerns expressed in the Resolution. The Resolution also states that the joint subcom-
mittee will consider whether the mechanic's lien statutes need to be revised or amended and
submit its findings and recommendations to the Governor in the 1992 session of the General
Assembly. H.J.R. 418, 1991 Sess. Va.
185. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-21; see also Strauss v. Princess Anne Marine and Bulkheading
Co., 209 Va. 217, 163 S.E.2d 198 (1968). On a related issue, section 43-3 of the Virginia Code
provides that "when the claim is for repairs or improvements to existing structures only,"
the lien will not "attach to the property repaired or improved unless such repairs or im-
provements were ordered or authorized by the owner or his agent." Therefore, in defending
against a mechanic's lien claiming amounts attributable to repairs or improvements to ex-
isting structures, a primary inquiry should be whether the owner, or its agent, ordered or
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Whether the mechanic's lien has priority over or is subordinate
to a deed of trust or other lien or encumbrance against the prop-
erty will have a profound effect upon the defense of the lien. For
example, if the mechanic's lien is subject or subordinate to the
deed of trust, the lender may not defend the mechanic's lien since
in any sale of the property to satisfy the mechanic's lien, the
lender's prior lien would have to be paid in full. On the other hand,
if the mechanic's lien is attributable to labor performed or materi-
als furnished in connection with "new" construction and has prior-
ity over the construction loan deed of trust, the extent of the
lender's interest in its collateral is threatened and the lender
should vigorously defend the lien.
X. STATUTORY DEFENSES TO MECHANICS' LIENS
A. Priority Given Owner by Statute
If the owner is compelled to complete the structure undertaken
by a general contractor as a result of the failure or refusal of the
general contractor to do so, the amount expended by the owner for
such completion shall have priority over all mechanics' liens which
have been or may be placed on the structure.188 The burden is on
the owner to adduce evidence as to the cost of completion. If the
owner completes the building and shows that the cost of doing so
has exhausted the fund, this will constitute a complete defense to
the mechanic's lien of a subcontractor. But where the owner does
not complete the building and does not offer any evidence as to the
cost of completion, the owner cannot use section 43-16 of the Code
of Virginia to claim a set off or counterclaim against the funds
which he is withholding from the general contractor. 87
B. Limitation on Amount for which Claimant may Perfect Lien
The amount for which a subcontractor may perfect a lien cannot
exceed the amount for which the owner is indebted to the general
contractor at the time the notice is given, or shall thereafter be-
authorized the repairs or improvements. If the repairs or improvements were not expressly
or impliedly authorized by the owner or its agents, the liens will be unenforceable.
186. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-16; Nicholas v. Miller, 182 Va. 831, 839, 30 S.E.2d 696, 699
(1944). A mere estimate will be sufficient to meet the owner's burden of showing that the
cost to complete exceeds the amount due the general contractor. See Henderson & Russell
Assocs., Inc. v. Warwick Shopping Center, 217 Va. 486, 229 S.E.2d 878 (1976).
187. Knight v. Ferrante, 202 Va. 243, 117 S.E.2d 283 (1960).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
come indebted to the general contractor through his contract with
the general contractor.188 It is an affirmative defense to a suit to
enforce the lien of a subcontractor that the owner is not indebted
to the general contractor or is indebted to the general contractor
for less than the amount of the lien sought to be enforced.18 The
statutory limit on the owner's liability is designed to relieve the
owner of the possibility of having to make a double payment under
the contract. 90 Assume the owner owes the general contractor
$10,000 and the general contractor owes the subcontractor $30,000.
The amount for which the subcontractor can perfect a lien is lim-
ited to $10,000. The owner would have an affirmative defense
under section 43-7 of the Code of Virginia in a suit to enforce the
lien, and the lien could only be enforced to the extent of $10,000.
The subcontractor may, of course, have a cause of action for
breach of contract against the general contractor for the full
$30,000; however, frequently, the general contractor has diverted
the funds received from the owner and is insolvent, leaving en-
forcement of the mechanic's lien as the only method of payment
available to the subcontractor.
The amount for which a lien may be perfected by a sub-subcon-
tractor cannot exceed the amount for which the subcontractor
could file a lien under section 43-7 of the Code of Virginia., 1
Therefore, under the statute, a sub-subcontractor is not entitled to
a lien unless the general contractor is indebted to the subcontrac-
tor at the time notice is served, or thereafter becomes indebted to
the subcontractor under the contract. 92 In short, the maximum
amount for which the subcontractor, and in turn the sub-subcon-
tractor, is entitled to claim a lien is governed by the condition of
accounts between the owner and the general contractor at the time
notice is given.193
188. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-7 to -9 (Repl. Vol. 1990); Waterval v. William Doolan Elevator
Serv., Inc., 212 Va. 114, 181 S.E.2d 637 (1971); Monk v. Walters, 195 Va. 246, 78 S.E.2d 202
(1953); John T. Wilson Co. v. McManus, 162 Va. 130, 173 S.E. 361 (1934); Maddux v.
Buchanan, 121 Va. 102, 107, 92 S.E. 830, 831 (1917).
189. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 43- to -9 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
190. Sinicrope v. Black Diamond Say. & Loan Ass'n, 21 Bankr. 476 (Bankr. W.D. Va.
1982).
191. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-9 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
192. Id.
193. John T. Wilson Co. v. McManus, 162 Va. 130, 135, 173 S.E. 361, 362 (1934); see
Atlantic States Constr. Co. v. McCann Steel Co., 210 Va. 473, 171 S.E.2d 689 (1970).
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C. Procedure to Challenge Validity of Lien
Although not necessarily a substantive defense under the forego-
ing statutes, Virginia Code section 43-17.1 provides a very useful
mechanism for aggressively defending an improperly or wrongfully
filed mechanic's lien. 9 The owner, or any party having an interest
in the real property against which a lien has been filed, may, upon
a showing of good cause, petition the court where the property is
located to hold a hearing to determine the validity of any perfected
lien on the property. After reasonable notice19 to the lien claimant
and any party to whom the benefit of the lien would inure and who
has given notice as provided by section 43-18 of the Code of Vir-
ginia; the court will hold a hearing to determine the validity of the
lien.19 8
The Supreme Court of Virginia interprets broadly the standing
of a "party in interest in real property" when the validity of a lien
under the statute is being challenged.197 If the court finds that the
lien is invalid, it must immediately order that the memorandum of
lien be removed of record."" The intent of this statute is to pro-
vide the owner or any other party in interest in the property with a
means to immediately attack a mechanic's lien without having to
wait to assert a defense to a suit to enforce the lien, which the
claimant is not required to bring until six months from the date
the memorandum of mechanic's lien is filed.1 99
A petition may also be used to raise defects in a mechanic's lien
as a substitute for a demurrer, where matters outside the four cor-
ners of the pleading must be relied upon in demonstrating that the
claimant failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or
that the lien is otherwise defective. A petition may be filed at any-
time after the memorandum of mechanic's lien is filed or during
the proceedings to enforce the mechanic's lien.
194. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-17.1 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
195. Id. § 43-18 (notice provisions).
196. Id. § 43-17.1.
197. PIC Constr. Co. v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 218 Va. 915, 919, 241 S.E.2d 804, 807
(1978). A beneficiary under a deed of trust has an interest in property sufficient to entitle
the beneficiary to petition a court to determine the validity of a mechanic's lien. Potomac
Say. Bank v. Virginia Clay Prod., Inc., 19 Va. Cir. 109, 110 (County of Fairfax 1990).
198. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-17.1 (Repl. Vol. 1990).-
199. Id. §§ 43-17.1, -17.
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XI. NONSTATUTORY SUBSTANTIVE DEFENSES TO MECHANICS' LIENS
A bill to enforce a mechanic's lien is an in rem proceeding
against the owner of the property which has been improved by the
labor and material of a mechanic. While a lien is a liability in rem,
a claim is a liability in personam and is much more comprehensive
than a lien.200 Claims among the parties to a mechanic's lien suit
may be asserted as defenses to the lien. A common law defense or
cause of action relating to the contract that is the subject of a
mechanic's lien can be asserted by the owner of the property at a
hearing on the bill to enforce the lien.20 1
In a suit to enforce a mechanic's lien, the owner is entitled to set
off against the contractor's claim the sum which it would take to
complete the contract, and any damages sustained by the owner by
reason of the delay in the completion of the contract.20 2 These
damages will not necessarily be confined to a penalty or forfeiture
stipulated for in the contract.203 In a mechanic's lien suit, the
owner may be permitted to set off the amount of any provable
damages occasioned by the general contractor's faulty construction
work.20 4 In addition, the owner may offset damages due to a breach
of contract by the general contractor.20 5
XII. DEFENSES TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF A MECHANIC'S LIEN
A. General Requirements
A bill or petition to enforce a memorandum of mechanic's lien
must be filed in the chancery court where the building or structure,
200. Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Town of Cape Charles, 144 Va. 56, 61, 131 S.E. 437, 439
(1926).
201. Dobyns Constr., Inc. v. Taylor, 14 Va. Cir. 324 (County of Fairfax 1989). A bill for
specific performance states a different cause of action from a bill to enforce a mechanic's
lien, and thus a bill of complaint for the latter cannot be amended to add a claim for the
former. J.E. Jacobs & Assocs. v. Shomette, 17 Va. Cir. 240 (County of Fairfax 1989).
202. Rison v. Moon, 91 Va. 384, 22 S.E. 165 (1895).
203. Id. Where an owner pays into the court the balance due the general contractor and
requests that the court determine the validity of the liens of various subcontractors, the
liens allowed must share pro rata in the fund on deposit with the court, after first deducting
the cost of litigation to the owner with respect to the allowed claim; see also H.N. Francis &
Co. v. Hotel Rueger, Inc., 125 Va. 106, 124, 99 S.E. 690, 695 (1919).
204. Mann v. Clowser, 190 Va. 887, 59 S.E.2d 78 (1950); Adams v. Tri-City Amusement
Co., 124 Va. 473, 98 S.E. 647 (1919).
205. Erlich v. Hendrick Constr. Co., 217 Va. 108, 225 S.E.2d 665 (1976); Kirk Reid Co. v.
Fine, 205 Va. 778, 139 S.E.2d 829 (1965); Kirn v. Champion Iron Fence Co., 86 Va. 608, 10
S.E. 885 (1890).
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or some part thereof, is located, or where any owner of the prop-
erty resides.206 The suit to enforce the lien must be filed within six
months from the time of the filing of the memorandum of lien, or
within sixty days from the time the building or structure is com-
pleted or the work is otherwise terminated, whichever occurs
last.0 7
The bill of complaint must affirmatively allege that the bill was
filed within six months from the date the lien was filed or sixty
days from the day the building was completed or the work was
terminated, otherwise it may be dismissed on demurrer.208 Usually,
a defense based upon the expiration of a limitations period is a
personal one, and can be relied upon only by the debtor, but Vir-
ginia courts have held in a suit to enforce a mechanic's lien that
one creditor may set up the statute of limitations against the
claims of another.209 The bill should also allege, inter alia that the
memorandum of mechanic's lien was filed within the ninety-day
period mandated by the Code of Virginia section 43-4, that the lien
does not contain amounts outside the 150-day period prescribed by
Virginia Code section 43-4, that notice was given and that the
claimant has complied with all other requirements of Title 43 re-
lating to mechanics' liens. While the memorandum of mechanic's
lien may be filed by the claimant, a bill to enforce the lien must be
filed and signed by a lawyer authorized to practice in Virginia.210
Since the statute creates the right as well as the remedy, upon
the expiration of the limitations period, the right to a mechanic's
lien expires as well.211 The ordinary rules or maxims of equity re-
garding statutory compliance are not applicable to a bill in equity
to enforce a mechanic's lien.21 2 The limitations periods set forth in
Virginia Code section 43-17 sets forth the maximum time within
which the mechanic's lien must be enforced. However, there are
206. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-22 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
207. Id. § 43-17.
208. Savings Bank of Richmond v. Powhatan Clay Mfg. Co., 102 Va. 274, 46 S.E. 294
(1904). But see Sands v. Stagg, 105 Va. 444, 446-47, 52 S.E. 633, 634 (1906).
209. McCartney v. Tyrer, 94 Va. 198, 26 S.E. 419 (1897).
210. A bill to enforce a mechanic's lien was held unenforceable where the president of the
corporate lien claimant filed the suit because the corporate president's action constituted
the unauthorized practice of law. Crump Floor & Tile, Inc. v. ChurchilH/Fairmount Bldg.
Co., 8 Va. Cir. 375 (City of Richmond 1987).
211. The defense of expiration of the time limitations is an absolute bar to the enforce-
ment of the mechanic's lien. See Neff v. Garrard, 216 Va. 496, 219 S.E.2d 878 (1975).
212. H.L. Coleman, Stone Tile & Supply Co. v. Pearman, 159 Va. 72, 82, 165 S.E. 371, 374
(1932).
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several factors which favor filing a suit to enforce the lien well
before the expiration of the statutory periods. In practice, if the
mechanic's lien has not been satisfied within two months from the
date of filing, it is unlikely that payment will be forthcoming in the
next four months. The claimant should file and serve a suit to en-
force the lien early to force the owner, general contractor and other
parties to respond to the lien. In addition, the claimant may con-
sider initiating discovery so that the responses to the discovery are
made within the six-month period. This will give the claimant an
opportunity to cure any defects in the suit prior to the expiration
of the limitations period.
Further, the existence of several mechanic's lien claimants seek-
ing to secure their claims with the property of the owner due to the
failure or refusal of the general contractor to pay the claimants
often indicates that a bankruptcy is looming ahead. Once the
owner files bankruptcy, the claimant must obtain relief from the
automatic stay to file a suit to enforce the lien.213 This increases
the cost of litigation and serves to delay enforcement of the claim-
ant's lien. From the defense lawyer's perspective, the longer the
claimant waits to enforce the lien, the better. There are many po-
tential jurisdictional defects in the suit to enforce a mechanic's lien
which could be cured by amending the suit within the limitations
period.214 Any jurisdictional defects in the suit must be cured by
amendment within the limitations period. 1 5 In practice, many
claimants wait until the last day of the limitations period to file
the suit to enforce the lien. If this is the case and jurisdictional
defects appear on the face of the pleading, the defense lawyer
should file a demurrer since the claimant has failed to state a claim
upon which can be granted.10
B. Effect of Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy laws protect rather than defeat lienholders and po-
tential lienholders. The filing of a memorandum of mechanic's lien
is not prohibited by the automatic stay since the filing of the mem-
213. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988); VA. CODE ANN. § 43-17 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
214. For example, as discussed infra pp. 333-36, the failure of a claimant to name all
necessary parties to the suit within the limitations period will cause the enforcement suit to
be dismissed. See Walt Robbins, Inc. v. Damon Corp., 232 Va. 43, 348 S.E.2d 223 (1986);
Mendenhall v. Douglas L. Cooper, Inc., 239 Va. 71, 76, 387 S.E.2d 468, 471 (1990).
215. Mendenhall, 239 Va. at 76, 387 S.E.2d at 471.
216. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-273 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
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orandum is merely designed to perfect the mechanic's lien rather
than to enforce the mechanic's lien against the property of the
debtor. 17 The filing of a bankruptcy petition by a general contrac-
tor operates to stay an action to enforce a mechanic's lien brought
by a subcontractor.218
[I]f applicable nonbankruptcy law.., fixes a period for commenc-
ing... a civil action in a court other than a bankruptcy court on a
claim against the debtor, . . . and such period has not expired
before the date of the filing of the petition, then such period does
not expire until the later of-(1) the end of such period, including
any suspension of such period occurring on or after the commence-
ment of the case; or (2) thirty days after notice of the termination or
expiration of the stay under § 362. . . with respect to such claim.211
It is clear that a lien claimant can institute an enforcement suit
at any time within thirty days after notice of the termination or
expiration of the stay.220 Other courts which have construed the
above statute, or its statutory predecessors, have held that a claim-
ant has thirty days from the date of the termination of the auto-
matic stay in which to file a bill to enforce a mechanic's lien.221
217. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988); H.T. Bowling, Inc. v. Bain, 52 Bankr. 58, 60 (W.D. Va. 1985);
In re Bain, 64 Bankr. 581, 583 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1986). But see Donohoe Constr. Co. v.
Mount Vernon Assocs., 235 Va. 531, 538-39, 369 S.E.2d 857, 861 (1988) (the filing of a mem-
orandum of mechanic's lien constitutes a judicial proceeding).
218. Middleton & Dugger Plumbing & Heating, Inc., v. Richardson Builders, Inc., No. 89-
01393 (Bankr. W.D. Va.). Judge William E. Anderson reasoned in this Lynchburg case that
[b]ecause the subcontractor's claims against the property are limited to the amount
by which the owner is indebted to the general contractor, the amount the owner owes
the general contractor will always be an issue in the subcontractor's action .... It is
clear that any sums due from the owner to the general contractor-debtor at the time
the bankruptcy petition was filed are the property of the estate. The fact that the
subcontractors have liens on the owner's real estate, not on the funds in the hands of
the owner, does not mean that the enforcement action does not affect property of the
estate. Although a lienoi seeks to enforce the lien against real estate, the court may
enter a personal decree against the owner and determine breaches of contract. Id.
219. 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) (1988).
220. Where a bankruptcy court order does not terminate the automatic stay, within the
meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 108(c)(2), but merely modifies the automatic stay to allow a lien
claimant to file a bill of complaint to enforce the lien, the thirty-day period under 11 U.S.C.
§ 108(c)(2) will not commence to run. McCoy v. Chrysler Condo Developers, Ltd., 239 Va.
321, 324, 389 S.E.2d 905, 907 (1990).
221. See, e.g., In re Nash Phillips/Copus, Inc., 78 Bankr. 798 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1987);
H.T. Bowling, Inc. v. Bain, 52 Bankr. 58 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1985),-aff'd sub nom. In re Bain,
64 Bankr. 581 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1986); In re Cantrup, 38 Bankr. 148 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1984);
In re Houts, 23 Bankr. 705 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982); In re Design Builders, Inc., 18 Bankr.
392 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1981); In re Hospelhorn, 18 Bankr. 395 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981); Glen
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C. Multifariousness
Where multiple mechanics' liens are filed against several individ-
ual lots, each lot represents a separate and distinct security.222 In a
sense, each lot stands as a separate debtor-an in rem defend-
ant-against which liability for the labor performed or material
furnished on that particular lot can be enforced.223 A demurrer
may be sustained due to multifariousness where a claimant seeks
to enforce several mechanics' liens affecting several different lots in
a single suit; several distinct and disconnected claims are asserted
against several in rem defendants, but all the in rem defendants
are not interested in the matters litigated.224 Multiple mechanic's
lien claims cannot be combined, established or reduced to one
judgment in the aggregate amount of the liens. Each claim, if es-
tablished, must be made effective as a separate in rem judgment.225
If, however, the equities can conveniently be administered in a sin-
gle suit, the court may, in its discretion, overrule an objection to
multifariousness and permit the bill of complaint to stand.226
Other jurisdictions are divided on the issue of whether it is
proper to seek to enforce multiple mechanics' liens in a single
suit.227 The confluence of Virginia statutory and decisional law and
Constr. Co. v. Bank of Vienna, 410 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Va. 1976), rev'd on other grounds,
557 F.2d 1050 (4th Cir. 1977); Hill-Behan Lumber Co. v. Sellers, 149 S.W.2d 465 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1941).
222. The terms "separate and distinct" must be read and interpreted in conjunction with
the prior use of identical language in decisions involving single or divisible contracts and
multifariousness. 'See United Masonry, Inc. v. Jefferson Mews, Inc., 218 Va. 360, 380, 237
S.E.2d 171, 183 (1977); Shelton v. Ogus, 201 Va. 417, 420, 111 S.E.2d 408, 410 (1959); Collins
v. Lyon, Inc., 181 Va. 230, 24 S.E.2d 572 (1945); Jones v. Morris Plan Bank, 168 Va. 284, 191
S.E. 608 (1937).
223. Shelton, 201 Va. at 420, 111 S.E.2d at 410.
224. See Morris v. Scruggs, 147 Va. 166, 136 S.E. 655 (1927); Dennis v. Justus, 115 Va.
512, 79 S.E. 1077 (1913); Baker v. Berry Hill Mineral Springs Co., 109 Va. 776, 65 S.E. 656
(1909); Atkinson Tile Co. v. MacCarthy Co. of Virginia-Maryland, Ch. No. 51112 (County of
Fairfax 1977); Herbert Bros. v. MacCarthy Co. of Virginia-Maryland, Ch. No. 51113 (County
of Fairfax 1977); Arlington Insulation Corp. v. MacCarthy Co. of Virginia-Maryland, Ch.
No. 51540 (County of Fairfax 1977). See also MEADE, LILE'S EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE
§ 312 (3d ed. 1952).
225. Shelton, 201 Va. at 420, 111 S.E.2d at 410.
226. Spooner's Adm'r v. Hilbish Ex'r, 92 Va. 333, 23 S.E. 751 (1895); Trus Joist Corp. v.
Sir Galahad Corp., 16 Va. Cir. 516 (City of Va. Beach 1982); MEADE, supra note 224, at 183-
84.
227. The following cases from other jurisdictions hold that multiple liens can be enforced
in a single suit: Richardson Lumber Co. v. Howell, 219 Ala. 328, 122 So. 343 (1929); Wade v.
Wyker, 171 Ala. 466, 55 So. 141 (1911); Williams v. Judd-Wells Co., 91 Iowa 378, 59 N.W.
271 (1894); ACME Lumber Co. v. Cope, 231 Mich. 198, 203 N.W. 659 (1925); Aimee Realty
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authorities from other jurisdictions mandates that multiple liens
cannot be enforced in a single bill where: (1) there is not a single or
"one piece of work" contract; (2) all lots are not owned by a single
owner; (3) the lots liened are not contiguous; (4) various owners,
trustees and beneficiaries under deeds of trust are involved; and
(5) individual liens have been filed against individual lots involving
amounts due for materials furnished or labor performed in connec-
tion with specific improvements on each of the individual lots.
D. Necessary Parties
If an individual is in actual enjoyment of property subject to a
mechanic's lien, or has an interest in it (either in possession or ex-
pectancy) which is likely either to be defeated or diminished by
the claimant's lien, all persons who have such immediate interest
are necessary parties to the suit to enforce the lien.2 8 A necessary
party's interest in the property against which the lien is sought,
and in the relief sought in the suit to enforce the lien, is so bound
up with that of the other parties that its legal presence as a party
to the proceeding is an absolute necessity, without which the court
cannot proceed.2
In the context of Virginia Code section 43-17, the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that when an amendment introduces a new
claim or makes new demands, the statute continues to run until
the time of the amendment.23 0 An amended bill bringing in a bene-
ficiary and trustee under an antecedent deed of trust presents a
new question, concerning the priority of the lien created by the
antecedent deed of trust.2 3 1 Where new defendants are added to a
bill to enforce a mechanic's lien which also presents new and dif-
Co. v. Haler, 128 Mo. App. 66, 106 S.W. 588 (1907). The following cases hold that a sepa-
rate suit must be filed to enforce each individual mechanic's lien fied: Bennett Realty Co. v.
Isbell, 219 Ala. 318, 122 So. 337 (1929); College Court Realty Co. v. J.C. Letcher Lumber
Co., 201 Ala. 362, 78 So. 218 (1917); Osburne v. Barnes, 179 Mass. 597, 61 N.E. 276 (1901).
228. See, e.g., Raney v. Four Thirty Seven Land Co., 233 Va. 513, 519-20, 357 S.E.2d 733,
736 (1987); Gaddess v. Norris' Ex'rs, 102 Va. 625, 630, 46 S.E. 905, 907 (1904).
229. Walt Robbins, Inc. v. Damon Corp., 232 Va. 43, 48, 348 S.E.2d 223, 226-27 (1986);
Bonsal v. Camp, 111 Va. 595, 597, 69 S.E. 978, 978-79 (1911).
230. Mendenhall v. Douglas L. Cooper, Inc., 239 Va. 71, 76, 387 S.E.2d 468, 471 (1986);
accord Viracon, Inc. v. Southeastern Glass & Door, Ch. No. 90-365 (County of Chesterfield
1990).
231. Neff v. Garrard, 216 Va. 496, 498, 219 S.E.2d 878, 879-880 (1975); see also, Common-
wealth Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Standard Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 222 Va. 330,
331, 281 S.E.2d 811 (1981); United Materials & Servs., Inc. v. National Capital Developers, 8
Va. Cir. 48 (City of Alexandria 1982).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:291
ferent claims, the enforcement suits against the new defendants
are deemed to have been commenced at the time of the amend-
ments.282 In short, if the enforcement suits are not brought against
the new, necessary defendants within the time required, the suits
to enforce the mechanics' liens will be dismissed.33
The owner of record of the property at the time the bill to en-
force the mechanic's lien is filed is a necessary party to the suit,
and the failure to timely name the owner will render the suit unen-
forceable on demurrer. 2 4 A general contractor may be a proper
and necessary party to a suit to enforce a mechanic's lien. 235 The
trustee or trustees and beneficiary under an antecedent deed of
trust recorded on unimproved land are necessary parties to a suit
to enforce a mechanic's lien on the improvements.23 6 The presence
of the trustees under a deed of trust as defendants in a mechanic's
lien proceeding is not sufficient to bind the beneficiaries. 237 A bill
to enforce a mechanic's lien filed against an owner who is misde-
232. Mendenhall, 239 Va. at 76, 387 S.E.2d at 471; Damon Corp., 232 Va. at 48, 348
S.E.2d at 226-27 (a claimant may not amend its suit to add the trustee or beneficiary of an
antecedent deed of trust after the expiration of the time prescribed by VA. CODE ANN. § 43-
17); American Sheet Metal Corp. v. Continental Diamond Springs Assoc., 10 Va. Cir. 451
(City of Va. Beach 1988).
233. Continental Diamond Springs, 10 Va. Cir. at 453.
234. Id.; see also Winder Plumbing, Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Kanawha Trace
Dev. Partners, 19 Va. Cir. 333 (City of Richmond 1990); In re Shirley J. Harris v. CMANE
Beaumeade Ltd. Partnership, Ch. No. 12564 (County of Loudoun 1990) (owner still neces-
sary party to suit where lien bonded off under VA. CODE ANN. § 43-71 before suit is filed);
Mark Hunt v. Eastbridge Elec. Inc., 20 Va. Cir. 43 (County of Loundon 1989) (owner is
necessary party to suit where lien bonded off'under VA. CODE ANN. § 43-70 after suit is
brought); Old Dominion Mechanical of Virginia, Inc. v. K & G Enters., Inc., Ch. Nos. C87-
542-C87-554 (City of Norfolk 1987); W.D. Sams & Son, Inc. v. Davis Constr. & Dev. Corp.,
14 Va. Cir. 506 (City of Va. Beach 1983); Burton Lumber Corp. v. Davis Constr. & Dev.
Corp., 14 Va. Cir. 503 (City of Virginia Beach 1983); Colonial Woodcraft, Inc. v. Davis Con-
str. & Dev. Corp., Ch. No. C82-267 (City of Va. Beach 1983);'Allen v. Davis Constr. & Dev.
Corp., Ch. No. C82-920 (City of Va. Beach 1983).
235. See Middleton & Dugger Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Richardson Builders, Inc., No.
89-01393 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1989); see also Gist v. Virginia Ry. Co., 79 W. Va. 167, 90 S.E.
554 (1916); James Sons Co. v. Farley, 71 W. Va. 173, 76 S.E. 169 (1912); Augir v. Warder, 68
W. Va. 752, 70 S.E. 719 (1911).
236. Mendenhall v. Douglas L. Cooper, Inc., 239 Va. 71, 75, 387 S.E.2d 468, 471 (1990);
Walt Robbins, Inc. v. Damon Corp., 232 Va. 43, 48, 348 S.E.2d 223, 226-27 (1986); Jennings
v. City of Norfolk, 198 Va. 277, 287, 93 S.E.2d 302, 309 (1956); James T. Bush Constr. Co. v.
Patel, Ch. No. N-2649-4 (City of Richmond 1990); Nuttall Constr. v. Elsi-Wan Dev. Corp.,
Ch. No. 18429-S (City of Newport News 1989); Ko v. Stonehenge Constr., Inc., Ch. No.
7096-87 (County of Chesterfield 1988); Almond Constr. Co. v. Runnington Inv. Corp., Ch.
No. C85-1737 (City of Norfolk 1987); Greenwich Supply Corp. v. Nonni Homes Co., Ch. No.
Ch-11091 (City of Va. Beach 1987); Lunsford v. Wren, 64 W. Va. 458, 63 S.E. 308 (1908).
237. Burton Lumber Corp. v. Davis Constr. and Dev. Corp., 14 Va. Cir. 503, 505 (City of
Va. Beach 1983).
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scribed as a beneficiary of a deed of trust may be valid. 8
Trustees and beneficiaries under a deed of trust recorded subse-
quent to the recordation of the memorandum of mechanic's lien
sought to be enforced in the suit are not necessary parties. How-
ever, such parties should be made parties. to the suit since their
interests may be affected. 239 Where a note has been assigned and
the assignee has not recorded an assignment evidencing its interest
or trustees have been substituted but no substitution of trustee has
been recorded, these parties are not entitled to protection from a
mechanic's lien because of their failure to record their interests,
and therefore, they are not necessary parties to a bill to enforce a
mechanic's lien.240
Judgment lien creditors should be made parties to a suit to en-
force a mechanic's lien since the object of the suit is to ascertain
the interests of all persons who claim an interest in the property
and to determine a proper distribution of proceeds upon sale.24 '
Therefore, other claimants with mechanics' liens against the same
property should also be made parties to a suit to enforce a
mechanic's lien, even though they may not be necessary parties.242
If other claimants with mechanics' liens against the same property
are named by a claimant in a suit to enforce its lien, however, this
may reduce the amount ultimately distributed to the claimant fil-
ing the suit since involvement in the proceeding could "remind"
the other claimants to file suit to enforce their liens. The claimant
may consider naming the other mechanic's lien claimants as par-
ties to the suit, but not serving them with notice of the suit until
after the limitations period to enforce their liens has expired.
If a bond is filed before the suit to enforce the lien is filed, the
surety on the bond must be made a party to the suit. If, on the
other hand, the bond is filed after the suit is filed, there is no re-
quirement to make the surety a party.
243
238. W.D. Sams & Son, Inc. v. Davis Constr. and Dev. Corp., 14 Va. Cir 506, 507 (City of
Va. Beach 1983).
239. Monk v. Exposition Deepwater Pier Corp., 111 Va. 121, 122, 68 S.E. 280, 280-81
(1910).
240. E.E. Stump Well Drilling Inc. v. Willis, 230 Va. 445, 450, 338 S.E.2d 841, 843 (1986).
241. See Finkel Outdoor Prod., Inc. v. Bell, 205 Va. 927, 140 S.E.2d 695 (1965).
242. Monk, 111 Va. at 123, 68 S.E. at 280-81.
243. B.K. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Imprecon Structures, Inc., Ch. No. 110228 (County of
Fairfax 1989).
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E. Itemized Statement of Account
The claimant is required to file an itemized statement of ac-
count, verified by affidavit, with the bill to enforce mechanic's
lien.244 The Supreme Court of Virginia has reasoned that it is diffi-
cult to conceive how, without items, there can be an account which
is an itemized or detailed statement of the transaction to which it
relates.245 However, the court held that a lack of particularity in a
statement of account is not jurisdictional so as to cause the bill to
be dismissed.246 If the defendant is not satisfied with the informa-
tion provided in the statement of account, the defendant should
file a bill of particulars.247
A statement of account should set forth in detail the work done
and materials furnished.2 48 The total failure of the claimant to file
the itemized statement of account makes the bill demurrable, and
the suit may be dismissed.249 Where an unverified itemized stAte-
ment of account is filed with the bill of complaint, the claimant
may file the verified affidavit after the defendant files a demurrer
but before the court acts on the demurrer to overcome the
objection. 50
244. Virginia Code section 43-22 provides that:
[t]he plaintiff shall file with his bill an itemized statement of his account, showing
the amount and character of the work done or materials furnished, the prices charged
therefor, the payments made, if any, the balance due, and the time from which inter-
est is claimed thereon, the correctness of which account shall be verified by the affi-
davit of himself, or his agent.
VA. CODE ANN. § 43-22 (Repl. Vol. 1990) (emphasis added).
245. Shackleford v. Beck, 80 Va. 573, 577 (1885). (Note should be taken that Beck was
decided before the General Assembly of Virginia substantially revised the mechanic's lien
statutes in 1919. Prior to the revision an account, including all invoices, delivery tickets and
other related documents had to be filed in the clerk's office where the property was located
to perfect the lien. After 1919, the memorandum of mechanic's lien, as prescribed by the
forms as set forth in Virginia Code §§ 43-5, -8 and -10, were substituted for the account.
Therefore, the precedential value of Beck after this significant revision is questionable.)
246. Knight v. Ferrante, 202 Va. 243, 248, 117 S.E.2d 283, 287 (1960).
247. Id.
248. Beck, 80 Va. at 577.
249. Lowes, Inc. v. Lundbloom, Ch. No. 6760 (City of Chesapeake 1979).
250. See Herbert Bros., Inc. v. McCarthy Co. of Virginia-Maryland, 220 Va. 907, 265
S.E.2d 685 (1980); Trus Joist Corp. v. Sir Galahad Corp., 16 Va. Cir. 516 (City of Va. Beach
1982).
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XIII. CONCLUSION
In decision after decision, the Virginia judiciary has demon-
strated that strict compliance with the statutory procedures is a
prerequisite to enforcement of a mechanic's lien. Notwithstanding
the equitable nature of the remedy, the failure to rigidly comply
with the law often results in a total forfeiture of the lien. A thor-
ough title examination of the property against which the lien is
sought, and an analysis of the results of the title search prior to
filing the lien is critical. Most of the potential procedural or techni-
cal defenses can be easily avoided by careful title work. These pro-
cedural defenses often overshadow any substantive defenses. The
mechanic's lien claimant should be particularly sensitive to: (1) the
period in which the claimant must perfect its lien as prescribed by
section 43-4 of the Code of Virginia; (2) the limitations period ap-
plicable to filing a suit to enforce the lien set forth in section 43-17
of the Code of Virginia; (3) naming all proper and necessary par-
ties to the suit to enforce the mechanic's lien within the period
allowed by section 43-17 of the Code of Virginia, and (4) the prin-
ciples relating to blanket and overinclusive liens. In sum, rigid ad-
herence to the statutes provides "the way and the only way" to
perfect and enforce a mechanic's lien in Virginia.2 51
251. Beck, 80 Va. at 577.

